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Abstract
The blockchain concept forms the backbone of a new wave technology that promises to
be deployed extensively in a wide variety of industrial and societal applications. Gov-
ernments, financial institutions, banks, industrial supply chains, service companies,
and even educational institutions and hospitals are investing in a substantial manner in
the hope of improving business efficiency and operational robustness through deploy-
ment of blockchain technology. This thesis work is concerned with designing trustwor-
thy business-to-business (B2B) market platforms drawing upon blockchain technology
and game theory.
The proposed platform is built upon three key ideas. First, we use permissioned
blockchains with smart contracts as a technically sound approach for building the B2B
platform. The blockchain deploys smart contracts that govern the interactions of en-
terprise buyers and sellers. Second, the smart contracts are designed using a rigor-
ous analysis of a repeated game model of the strategic interactions between buyers
and sellers. We show that such smart contracts induce honest behavior from buyers
and sellers. Third, we embed cryptographic regulation protocols into the permissioned
blockchain to ensure that business sensitive information is not revealed to the competi-
tors. We believe our work is an important step in the direction of building a powerful
B2B platform that maximizes social welfare and enables trusted collaboration between
strategic enterprise agents.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter provides motivation and background for the work presented in
this thesis, along with a brief review of relevant work. Platforms that enable
collaboration between enterprise agents are few with limited functionality as
a result of technological limitations. Relevant literature in economics as well
as supply chains suggests that collaboration is needed in order to sustain high-
quality offerings from sellers.
1.1 Motivation and Background
A Business-to-Business (B2B) platform, as depicted in Figure 1.1, is one which enables
interactions amongst enterprise buyers and sellers along with service providers such
as logistics providers. Such a platform also serves the purpose of enabling information
exchange amongst competing manufacturers/suppliers. B2B platforms are growing
fast and intend to help upcoming businesses manage and streamline their work [35].
The design of robust B2B collaboration platforms and incentivizing cooperation on
them constitute important research directions.
A B2B procurement market platform is a B2B platform which helps facilitate the
procurement process of enterprises. Businesses can utilize such platforms to trade
goods and services which will be used to manufacture a good or deliver a service.
While recent years have seen a lot of progress in Business-to-Customers (B2C) market
platforms, especially with the advent of mobile applications, B2B platforms have not
progressed technologically. They continue to be centralized and use point-to-point
messages. One reason for this is a lack of technology which preserves privacy of the
agents interacting on the platform, especially from the platform itself. While it need
not be concerning for an individual if Amazon knows her purchase history, for an
enterprise such information is business-critical. Consequently, the functionality that
can be obtained by an enterprise from current B2B platforms gets limited. The work
presented in this thesis aims to help solve this problem by proposing a blockchain-
based solution.
Recent progress in distributed ledgering technology, which is collectively referred
1
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Figure 1.1: A B2B Platform
to as blockchain technology has gained widespread attention from media and industry.
In the last few years, it has quickly transitioned from an exciting technology, with a
cult user base for the Bitcoin cryptocurrency [30], to being seen as a powerful tool for
transformation of business ecosystems. The technology allows users on a distributed
peer-to-peer network to maintain a distributed ledger without any need for a central-
ized intermediary. At the core of any blockchain platform are,
1. A mechanism for secure and distributed consensus protocol for maintaining the
ledger, and
2. A framework to autonomously execute smart contracts based on the state of the
distributed ledger.
The initial research focus on blockchain has been on various security, privacy, and game
theoretic aspects of distributed consensus mechanisms for applications in cryptocurren-
cies. The focus of our work is on identifying and providing solutions to the issues that
are critical to making blockchain a tool for transforming business ecosystems.
An advantage of a blockchain-based market platform is that rules can be imposed
on the transactions that occur on the platform, by way of smart contracts. For instance,
smart contracts can be used to govern the prices charged, and can be a means of
ensuring that goods are traded at a fair price. The rules that are to be enforced can
be decided jointly after negotiations between the buyers association and the sellers
association. The appropriate form of blockchain technology for such a purpose would
be permissioned blockchains, where the access to the data is restricted to users of
a company or consortium of companies that manage the blockchain. Permissioned
networks are essential for business-to-business (B2B) collaborations as businesses need
to know who they are transacting with and there is a need to control the purposes for
which they transact with different entities.
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a typical B2C market platform, such as Amazon or eBay, when a buyer decides to buy
a particular good, she typically searches for it and is able to view different vendors
who sell the good. She then proceeds to buy from the vendor who she believes offers
the best tradeoff between quality and price. Studies indicate that to induce sellers to
consistently provide high-quality products, it is necessary to make it publicly known
when a seller fails to do so. B2C market platforms achieve this by way of ratings for
each good sold by a vendor.
Our work aims to enable an enterprise buyer to do the same on a B2B market
platform, while being incentivized to be honest. Further, we use a repeated game for-
mulation to study various pricing rules and punishment strategies, so as to identify the
ones that best incentivize high-quality offerings from sellers. This analysis is intended
to help design appropriate smart contracts which will define the interactions that occur
on the platform.
1.2 Review of Relevant Work
A motivation of our work is to achieve sustained cooperation amongst buyers and
sellers. Buyer-Seller interactions over market networks have been studied from various
aspects. From an economics point of view Fainmesser found that the frequency of
high-quality given by a seller in large market networks increases with moderate and
balanced competition, and that the inclusion of institutions like litigation can sustain
cooperation in denser networks [12].
Zhang and van der Scharr study this problem from a crowdsourcing aspect. They
consider a mechanism, where each worker has reputation in the set {0, 1, ..., KK}.
After each period, based on the report by the requester, assumed to be truthful, the
reputation is either incremented or decremented. If the reputation of a worker falls
below a threshold, she is put into isolation. They study how the choice of the threshold
affects cooperation. Conditions are given onKK as a function of the system parameters
on when the protocol will have the workers putting in high effort to take on the tasks
given to them, as a Nash equilibrium.
In order to sustain high-quality from sellers in a market, information about how
an agent behaves with other agents is needed[44]. However, this information often
remains local, known only to the two parties and perhaps their neighbors. Wolitzky
[44] studies two communication technologies to replicate public information.
While the problem at hand is of market interactions, the broader motivation of
our work is aimed towards supply chains. Much like in market networks, informa-
tion sharing in supply chains has been found to reduce costs both theoretically and
experimentally [5, 14, 15], much like in market networks.
We enable information sharing, and hence collaboration, between enterprise agents
by providing a cryptographic protocol for computing a ratings vector for the sellers,
without revealing their own input. This problem of jointly computing reputation of
agents or building reputation systems is neither new nor trivial. Procaccia et al [36]
use a gossip-based aggregation technique to provide a simple decentralized reputation
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system without a need for complex data structures. Jiang [23] attempts to design rep-
utation systems that are robust to attacks such as malicious ratings. Haghpanah [20]
focuses on reputation systems for supply chains which do not downweight the value
of feedback given by other participants. The method proposed in this thesis, for rat-
ing sellers on a B2B platform, is able to achieve the salient features of all of the three
papers mentioned above. Our problem also fits into the broader area of collaborative
rating, which is an important problem for recommender systems [10]. In the problem
of collaborative rating, ratings must be computed for a set of m objects jointly by n
users. Each user provides ratings on a strict subset of the m objects, and complete
ratings must be computed from these partial ratings. The problem of computing col-
laborative ratings itself is a specific case of the matrix completion problem, pioneered
by Candes and Retch [6].
1.3 Contributions of the Thesis
Having established the positioning of our work, we now provide an outline of the spe-
cific contributions of the work presented in this thesis. Figure 1.2 depicts the various
building blocks of the proposed platform and motivates the various contributions of
this work.
Figure 1.2: Building blocks of the proposed blockchain-based B2B platform
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A Formal Framework for Secure B2B Collaboration
One of the key aspects of B2B collaboration is that, often, the cooperating entities
are also competing entities and the information required for cooperation is business
sensitive information from competitive perspective. As discussed, designing a platform
that successfully enables privacy-preserving B2B collaboration is a non-trivial task and
requires a formal discussion. Therefore, there is a need for a framework to formulate
the requirements of a secure and private B2B collaboration. We provide a formal
notation for studying and analyzing all the components of a B2B platform and the
events that occur on the platform. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first
such framework for B2B collaboration.
Game Theoretic Modeling and Analysis
We use repeated games to analyze the strategic interactions between buyers and sellers
in the context of a supplier rating problem. We compute the equilibrium behavior
under different strategies and pricing settings. The analysis reveals that the equilibrium
attained is contingent on the sellers’ discounting factor for future payoffs, as well as,
on the profit margin of the pricing system. We study markets where social welfare is
maximized when sellers provide high quality and deduce conditions under which high
quality offerings constitute an equilibrium. These characterizations are of independent
interest in themselves. There is prior literature on game theoretic analysis of mining in
permissionless networks, exemplified by [26, 27]. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no prior work on a framework to study game theoretic aspects of blockchain based
B2B collaboration.
Implementation using Permissioned Blockchains and Cryptographic
Protocols
We show how to employ permissioned blockchain networks to securely and privately
mimic an oracle’s solution to the supplier rating problem. We deploy a smart contract
that implements the business logic in a given mechanism with the help of two regu-
lation protocols: (a) a public perception protocol and (b) a monitoring protocol. The
public perception protocol is a cryptographic protocol that aggregates buyer feedback
about sellers into a rating, known as the public perception vector, while preserving
privacy. The purpose of the monitoring protocol is to disincentivize dishonest feedback
by the buyers. We show that our implementation is a secure and private simulation of
the oracle’s supplier rating.
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1.4 Outline of the Thesis
The organization of this thesis is as follows.
Chapter 2: Foundations of Blockchain Technology
This chapter provides the foundations of blockchain technology. Section 2.1 covers
the building blocks of blockchain technology. It begins by explaining the different
contexts in which the term blockchain is used, followed by details of the blockchain
data structure. We describe the organization of data in the blockchain, followed by how
blocks are added to a blockchain, introducing two commonly used mining techniques.
Section 2.2 discusses the key features of blockchain technology, its role as an asset
ledger and introduces smart contracts. The chapter concludes with Section 2.3 which
gives a discussion of a commonly used classification of blockchains into permissionless
and permissioned blockchains. We discuss the issues that arise with each of them like
mining and scalability. We describe the various types of permissioning that may be
employed.
Chapter 3: Problem Formulation and Approach
The third chapter of the thesis presents the formulation of the problem studied in
this thesis along with the approaches followed. The chapter begins with Section 3.1
which first gives a brief description of the technology being used to deploy current
B2B platforms. It discusses the limitations of the current approach, and motivates
the use of permissioned blockchains for designing a B2B platform. The section then
concludes with the requirements of such a B2B platform. Section 3.2 then defines a
formal framework to study interactions on the platform. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first attempt at formally defining interactions over a blockchain network.
Section 3.3 goes on to detail the building blocks of this framework. It begins with
a description of the model, defining the repeated interactions as a repeated game.
Following this discussion, we introduce the cryptographic protocols that are used to
compute the ratings and the rating system adopted. The chapter concludes with the
definition of the public perception vector, that is we define how the feedback from the
buyers is aggregated into a ratings vector for the sellers.
Chapter 4: Game Theory Based Smart Contracts
The fourth chapter is devoted to game theoretic analysis of the problem presented in
the third chapter. The chapter begins with a few preliminaries on game theory. Section
4.1 formally defines strategic form games and Nash equilibrium. This chapter also
discusses some examples of strategic form games and the Nash equilibria that arise in
each of these games. Section 4.2 goes on to define Extensive Form Games, and what a
Nash equilibrium for an extensive form game is. It also presents a stronger notion of
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equilibrium called the subgame perfect equilibrium. Section 4.3 concludes the game
theory preliminaries by defining repeated games and how subgame perfect equilibria
can be characterized for a repeated game. It also explains the punishment aspect of
the problem studied in the thesis.
Section 4.4 begins the game theoretic analysis of the problem. This section consid-
ers a pricing rule called “Homogeneous Pricing”, where all sellers sell at the same price.
It is shown that the only pure strategy equilibria for such a system can be either giving
only high-quality or only low-quality. This section studies two different punishment
models, one where sellers are punished by individual buyers for providing low-quality
in a particular round. In the other model, a seller is punished collectively by the all
the buyers in the market if his rating drops below a threshold value. It is also shown
that the latter punishment model is better at incentivizing high-quality offerings from
sellers.
Section 4.5 considers a setting where sellers can sell their products at one of two
prices. Within this setting two cases are considered, one where the price at which a
seller sells never changes, and one where the price at which the seller sells is deter-
mined by his public perception. It is found that both these settings reduce to different
cases of homogeneous pricing, contingent on the parameters of the system. Section
4.6 takes the idea of the price being determined by the seller’s rating forward and the
seller’s rating is linearly transformed to determine the price which he charges. This
section finds behaviour that was not observed in the previous two sections. The chap-
ter concludes with the observation that the rather complicated behaviour observed in
the case of continuous pricing, prevents a closed form expression for characterizing the
Nash equilibria in this setting.
Chapter 5: Cryptographic Regulation Protocols
This chapter presents details of the cryptographic protocols deployed on the platform
which ensure that the requirements of the B2B platform listed in Chapter 2 are met.
We first present some relevant preliminaries on public-key cryptography and secure
multi-party computation required for the protocol, such as homomorphic encryption.
This is covered in Section 5.1. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 detail the two subprotocols, namely
the Monitoring Protocol and the Public Perception Protocol. The former ensures that
buyers are honest in their feedback, and the latter is responsible for actually aggregat-
ing buyer feedback into a ratings vector for the sellers. The chapter concludes with a
discussion on the properties of these protocols and how the appropriate requirements
are met by means of these protocols.
Chapter 6: Summary and Future Work
This chapter presents a summary of the thesis, along with some directions possible for
future work. Section 6.1 presents a summary of the results presented in the preceding
chapters. Section 6.2 discusses possible variations in the model presented in this thesis,
Chapter 1. Introduction 8
and accordingly lists the scope of future work in this problem.
1.5 Conclusion
A review of existing literature shows that to ensure consistent quality is received from
a seller, information of their behaviour should be made public to all the buyers. While
most B2C platforms allow for buyers to rate sellers, progress has been stalled in the
development of platforms enabling B2B collaboration. One of the reasons for this
is that interactions on such platforms should be such that privacy of the agents is
preserved.
A B2B market platform requires a privacy-preserving way to rate the enterprise
sellers or suppliers. The rating system must be robust to attacks such as malicious rat-
ings attacks. This problem is solved using permissioned blockchains and Multi-Party
Computation protocols. The other requirement of a B2B market platform is to incen-
tivize sellers to provide high-quality. We conduct game theoretic modeling and analysis
towards this end, which will be used to design smart contracts on the blockchain.
In the following chapter, we provide an overview of blockchain technology that is
relevant to our work.
Chapter 2
Foundations of Blockchain Technology
This chapter introduces the concept of blockchains along with several issues
and applications associated with blockchains. The term blockchain can re-
fer to the blockchain network, the distributed ledger or the data structure,
which makes the contents immutable. As a result of immutability, the use
of blockchains in a trustless setting makes the problem of adding new blocks
non-trivial. Thus, mining of new blocks becomes a natural concern when the
blockchain network is one without any restrictions. However the issues associ-
ated with the deployment of blockchains change when there is a restriction on
the roles a user can take up. This chapter discusses the aforementioned aspects
in detail and concludes with a glance at the application space of blockchains.
The contents of this chapter are culled out from a recently published survey
paper on blockchains [32].
Blockchain technology is promising to herald a new revolution in a rich variety of in-
dustrial and societal settings. Many important global businesses are trying to embrace
the blockchain technology to find solutions to their difficult problems. Governments,
financial institutions, banks, industrial supply chains, service companies, and even ed-
ucational institutions and hospitals are investing substantial sums of money in the hope
of improving business efficiency and operational robustness.
Under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto, an anonymous person or a group of per-
sons wrote a brilliant paper [30] in 2008 in which the bitcoin digital currency was
introduced. This paper introduced a simple but powerful data structure which Satoshi
Nakamoto called the blockchain. Using this data structure, which uses hashing to
achieve immutability of data, and through an intelligent design of incentives. This
paper launched the bitcoin revolution, which has now grown to the point that bitcoin
is now a household topic. Blockchains are now used in many different applications
apart from cryptocurrencies. With the functionality of a scripting language accompa-
nying the blockchain to build smart contracts, introduced by Ethereum[3], decentral-
ized applications or Dapps were launched and have escalated far more quickly than
anticipated. The term blockchain now goes beyond particular applications like Bitcoin
and Ethereum, and is used to signify the data structure, the data repository, which
9
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records the transactions, as well as the network on which these transactions occur. We
now explore each of these.
2.1 Blockchain Building Blocks
A blockchain network is typically a peer-to-peer network where each node has com-
puting resources and a data repository. The data repository at each node contains an
an up-to-date copy of the blockchain. Figure 2.1 illustrates a blockchain network and
its essential components: a computing resource and data repository within each node
and a lack of centralization.
Figure 2.1: A Blockchain network
2.1.1 Blockchain Data Structure
The blockchain data structure is a structured collection or shared ledger of blocks.
Figure 2 depicts a part of a typical blockchain. In this subsection, we describe the data
structure that is used in the bitcoin blockchain, to bring out all essential features of a
blockchain. A blockchain may contain any number of blocks. For example, the bitcoin
blockchain (as of January 2018) contains more than 210000 blocks.
As a data structure, a blockchain is a doubly linked list of the blocks. Thus, each
block has a pointer to the next block as well as a pointer to the previous block. Each
block contains the following:
• Data corresponding to a number of transactions. Each transaction may involve a
small subset of nodes and is represented in some digital form. A block may con-
tain any number of transactions. For example, a block in the bitcoin blockchain
could contain hundreds of transactions.
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Figure 2.2: A Blockchain
• A hash value corresponding to the current block.
• A hash value corresponding to the previous block.
Each hash value above is also called proof-of-work for that block. Proof-of-work for a
block is computed by solving a difficult cryptographic puzzle: this puzzle takes as input
the transaction data of that block and produces a final hash value, after a very large
number of hash computations, such that the final value that satisfies a certain criterion
that is difficult to achieve (for example, the hash value should start with a string of
four zeros, etc.). Because of the intensive nature of this computation and the massive
amount of computational work involved in producing this final hash value, the latter
is aptly called proof-of-work.
Since every block contains proof of work for the current block and proof-of-work
for the previous block, the blockchain becomes virtually immutable. This is because,
in order to modify a block, not only do you have to modify the current block but also
all successive blocks.
The data corresponding to each block is organized as a Merkle tree as shown in
Figure 3. Merkle tree is a binary tree data structure where hashing is used to facilitate
efficient verification of the contents of the tree. The leaf nodes contain the hash values
of individual transaction data. Each internal node contains only a hash value that is
computed using the hash values contained in its children. The root node will thus
contain a hash value which is called the root hash value. Given a Merkle tree, in order
to verify that a given a set of transactions is precisely the same as the transactions
stored in the Merkle tree, we only have to compute the hash value from the given
transaction data and verify that the hash value is the same that of the root hash value
in the given Merkle tree. A new block is included into the blockchain using a process
called mining which is described in the next section. Once a new block gets included,
the updated blockchain becomes available at all the nodes. The manner in which
the blockchain data structure is organized, updated, and replicated ensures that the
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Figure 2.3: Merkle Tree
blockchain is a shared, synchronized, immutable, distributed ledger created through
distributed consensus; all nodes have access to the ledger and can verify the truth.
Simply speaking, the blockchain elegantly implements tamper-proof record keeping.
The blockchain protocol is decentralized and eliminates the need for intermediation by
trusted third parties. Blockchain technology thus represents a deep one that combines
cryptography, data structuring, and distributed consensus in a brilliant way.
Blockchain technology provides a way to implement a distributed, shared ledger
without the need for a central trusted entity or trusted third parties. There are other
ways to implement a distributed, shared ledger but blockchain technology is superior
to the existing approaches because of the above features. For any immutable data
structure, which continues to be decentralized, the issue of adding new blocks to the
chain is not trivial. We now briefly study common techniques of adding new blocks to
the blockchain.
2.1.2 Mining of Blocks
The addition of a new block to a blockchain is based on inverting a hash function,
whose computational complexity is believed to grow exponentially in the length of the
input. This process is known as mining or validation. Mining secures the blockchain
system from fraudulent transactions. Mining can be done by any node in the (public)
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blockchain. The task of a miner is two fold: (1) to validate the data in the block and
(2) to append the valid block to the already existing blockchain. Note that the success
of the blockchain is attributed to the way mining is done i.e. how the verification
of data is done in a decentralized, anonymous fashion. In the next two subsections,
we present how this is achieved via the standard process called proof-of-work and a
modified process called proof-of-stake.
This section assumes a bitcoin/ethereum type of (public) blockchain. However, the
principles are relevant for other types of blockchains as well.
Proof-of-Work
The key idea behind proof-of-work is to make the selection of a miner in a way that
nobody can monopolize the system by creating fake nodes. This is ensured in proof-
of-work by making the nodes to compete to mine the block using their computation
power. This would imply that no single node can monopolize the blockchain protocol
as buying that much computation power would be next to impossible.
The proof-of-work is based on inverting a hash function where the hardness of
the computation can be controlled. This cryptographic computation is a hash function
based computation where each miner is required to find a random numeric value nonce
such that the cryptographic hash function of the nonce when combined with the data
and the hash value of the previous block results in a hash value that is less then a
specific target value. Specifically,
H(nonce||hash-of-previous-block||data-of-current-block) < target-value.
The target-value is adjusted automatically between the nodes in the blockchain so as to
maintain the difficulty of mining to be a certain time duration. Note that once a miner
broadcasts a mined block, every other node can verify that the mined block is valid
and thus will append this block to its own blockchain. The proof-of-work technique
described above prevents the problem of double-spending the same currency.
A disadvantage of proof-of-work is that it needs a massive amount of computation
power to validate a single block. Another problem is that mining has become rather
proprietary hardware centric which leads to centralization issues as people who are
manufacturing such hardware can control the blockchain system. Therefore, there is a
shift to other mining techniques like proof-of-stake.
Proof-of-Stake
In proof-of-stake, nodes are selected for mining in proportion to the blockchain cur-
rency each node is holding as opposed to the computation power in proof-of-work. In
proof-of-stake protocol, any node which holds blockchain based currency can become
a miner by depositing its currency to the blockchain. Selecting the validator can be
done in several ways, such as Randomized block selection and Coin age-based selection.
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The proof-of-stake protocol is significantly more computationally efficient over proof-
of-work protocol in terms of energy consumption, however, this protocol suffers from
other disadvantages like nothing at stake and long range attacks.
Immutability and mining protocols to achieve consensus contribute towards a blockchain
being a trusted ledger. We now explore the key features of blockchain technology
which are a consequence of the building blocks discussed in this section.
2.2 Blockchain Technology: Key Features
The unique value proposition of blockchains is that they enable the creation of digital
solutions with built in economics. This capability traces its roots to the first applica-
tions of blockchains: bitcoins as a digital currency. A necessary condition for a digital
currency is the existence of a trusted ledger which can maintain the balances of the
account holders. Nobody apart from the account owner should be able to reduce the
account balance; not even the entity responsible for maintaining the ledger. This is
precisely what is achieved by the blockchain. As a result, today blockchains are being
used to develop applications which require decentralized asset registries, such as land
registry, tamper-proof academic transcripts and even a registry for diamonds which
tracks a diamond right from when it is mined[7].
2.2.1 Asset Ledger
At its very core, a blockchain is a trusted ledger. As explained in the previous section,
the technological innovation of blockchains is that the trust in the ledger is ensured
using a combination of cryptography and distributed consensus. The most important
consequence of using a shared, trusted ledger is that everyone involved is able to
agree on a single version of the truth. Thus, an immediate application of blockchains
becomes as an asset registry. Assets such as land and property are the most common
assets used as collateral to secure a loan, and thus require a trusted, immutable registry.
One interesting question in creating a blockchain based asset registry relates to
privacy. Does storing asset ownership on a public registry imply that everyone knows
who owns what? Public blockchains like Ethereum and Bitcoin blockchains solve this
system by using pseudo-anonymity. Every agent in the system is recognized by its
account address (public key) but the blockchain does not store a mapping between this
account address and the real-world identity of the agent. With these blockchains, thus,
the mapping of assets to account addresses is common knowledge but the mapping
between the account address and real-world identity may be kept private (known only
to the individual agent). In the context of blockchains being used as an asset registry
for cryptocurrencies, it is this pseudo-anonymity property which poses challenges to
governments and law enforcement agencies worldwide.
With permissioned blockchains (discussed in detail in the next section), the issue is
less pronounced but still exists. With permissioned blockchains who all can become a
part of the blockchain network is controlled by an administrator, so information sharing
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(of the asset registry) is within a group. Often, however, there may be cases where two
(or more) agents in the network may want to undertake a transaction privately. Here
again is the requirement for privacy. Interesting solutions to this challenge continue
to be explored: cryptographic techniques like zero-knowledge proofs, ring signatures,
and hash functions can be combined in interesting ways to achieve privacy while still
ensuring trust in the underlying ledger.
2.2.2 Smart Contracts
Powerful as they are, the ideas of a trusted asset registry and a cryptocurrency are only
part of the complete picture. It is when these two ideas are combined with the idea
of self-enforcing contracts known as smart contracts that the real power of blockchains
becomes apparent. Smart contracts are the building blocks to create any decentralized
application.
A smart contract can be thought of as a conditional transaction, that is, a transaction
(or a group of transactions) which executes when certain conditions are met. The con-
ditions required for the transaction are written in a high level programming language
like Solidity, the scripting language accompanying Ethereum [3]. In this interpreta-
tion, a smart contract is a conditional transaction of value from one agent (account)
to other agent(s) conditional on certain events that may occur in the future. Once the
contract is deployed on the blockchain, it is guaranteed to execute as per the condi-
tions specified. This “guarantee” stems from the distributed nature of the blockchain.
When a smart contract is deployed on the blockchain, a copy of this smart contract
resides on every single node in the underlying peer-to-peer network. Each node exe-
cutes the smart contract code to check whether or not the conditions specified in the
contract have been met or not. The verification of these conditions is subject to the
same consensus algorithms that a transaction is, thus ensuring that the smart contract
executes if and only if the nodes in the blockchain agree that the conditions have been
met. To summarize, smart contracts are self-executing contracts written in a high level
programming language and deployed on a decentralized peer-to-peer network.
Traditionally, contracts underlie a vast span of global commerce, for example, pro-
curement contracts detail the requirements and the conditions under which payments
would be made or penalties imposed. Commercial contracts build up the trust for
the two (or more) parties thus facilitating trade across the globe. In the blockchain
world, these contracts are encoded in a programming language. In this context, smart
contracts are computer software which implement commercial contract using cryptog-
raphy and distributed systems. The great advantage of doing so is that once deployed,
these smart contracts are guaranteed to execute and do so automatically. Moreover,
since written on a blockchain, when transactions happen with the help of smart con-
tracts, these transactions are immutable. Not only does this enhances trust in the con-
tract, it also reduces manual overhead of contract verification, payments processing
etc.
To summarize, the key properties of smart contracts are:
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• Decentralized: The smart contracts are executed on hundreds of computers
without being controlled by any human. Thus, there are fewer risks of manipu-
lation or fraud.
• Autonomous: The smart contracts are executed by themselves once they are
launched and thus they speed up the trading or the process for what the smart
contracts are designed for.
• Auto-sufficiency: The smart contracts can be sufficient in their own way e.g.
they can collect money, provide automated access to storage units, vehicles, make
payment for insurance or rent, distribute resources, etc.
Trusted ledgers and conditional transactions are required not just by platforms like
Ethereum, where anybody can join, but also in more private settings. We now explore
blockchains in both public and private settings, and the associated issues.
2.3 Blockchain Types: Permissionless and Permissioned
A common way to categorizing the types of blockchains is based on the permission-
ing used. Permissioning refers to the requirement of permission to be able to take a
view or add blocks on the blockchain. Permissioning is a natural requirement for sev-
eral applications where there is a requirement of confidentiality. In this section, we
cover permissionless and permissioned blockchains, along with the consequences of
the permissioning model chosen.
2.3.1 Permissionless Blockchains
Permissionless or public blockchains are essentially blockchains that do not require
permission to view, join, or mine blocks. The lack of permission, may be essential to
the application, as in the case of some of the most popular blockchain applications such
as Ethereum and Namecoin, a decentralized platform to issue domain names. Typically,
such blockchains are intended for use by the masses. Several issues come up, or are
foreseen, as the majority of blockchain projects are yet to reach a level of maturity, in
the deployment of public blockchains. We now discuss some of these issues.
Mining
Allowing users to freely join the network also necessitates much stricter security. This is
required as public platforms cannot assume that nodes will not be malicious. The only
underlying assumption critical to guarantee the correct execution of such platforms, is
that the majority is honest. As a consequence, most common permissionless blockchain
platforms use proof-of-work mining, which typically takes longer to validate a block.
Ethereum, which has a relatively short validation time, when compared to other public
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blockchains, typically takes 12 seconds to mine a block. On the other hand, proof-of-
stake mining, such as that which is used in Hyperledger, ensures that transactions are
validated in 0.5 seconds.
Scalability
Zohar studies the problem of scalability as it pertains to cryptocurrencies, which are
typically implemented on public blockchains [46]. Currently, there are set limits for
the size of a block that can be put on the blockchain, which limits the number of trans-
actions that may be put on the block. With these limits held constant, as the number of
users grows on the blockchain, the number of transactions also increases, thus leading
to further delays in the time required to mine a block. Further, the need for compu-
tational power for such platforms is expected to grow much faster than the growth
in the available computational power, thus leading to centralization in the validation
of blocks [24]. Needless to say, this goes against the very purpose of a decentralized
ledger. Thus, permissionless blockchains face a major challenge of scalability. Som-
polinsky et al [38] offer solutions to the scalability problem by proposing an alternate
consensus scheme, built on Nakamoto’s work [30].
Privacy
While privacy is often a concern cited to justify the need for a private network, for an
individual, a public network provides more privacy. As there is no restriction for joining
the network, an individual may have multiple identities on the same network. Trans-
actions on the network are typically attributed to public keys of the parties involved.
Thus, by creating aliases on the network, individual users can each have multiple pub-
lic keys and hence ensure their privacy. This privacy, however, is limited to being
pseudonymity. There have been cases where leaks in transaction histories of merchant
websites have led to revelation of the true identity of the user [19].
Application Space
The use of permissionless blockchains is reduced to applications which are trustless.
Allowing anybody to join the network obviates the assumption of trust, and with it,
all applications which require a measure of trust. Consequently, the realm of cryp-
tocurrencies has seen the most prominent deployment of public blockchains. However,
applications of permissionless blockchains extend far beyond cryptocurrencies. Some
applications include prediction markets, land registry, voting and even governmental
services being provided through blockchains [40].
Ethereum
Ethereum is a public blockchain platform, with an accompanying programming lan-
guage, Solidity, to enable users to build distributed applications on it [40]. Ethereum
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provides rich functionality to solve computational problems through smart contracts.
This provision can be used by developers to build apps on top of Ethereum. Currently
deployed decentralized apps, or dapps, include those for voting, crowdfunding, online
marketplaces, auctions, etc.
Ethereum was proposed in 2014 by Vitalik Buterin, a young programmer who, at
that time, was known primarily for writing extensively on Bitcoin. It was an attempt
at heralding in the use of smart contracts in the cryptocurrency domain, by providing
a scripting language, to write smart contracts, in order to implement the intended
business logic [3] [45].
2.3.2 Permissioned Blockchains
Permissioned blockchains are typically not open for users to join freely. However, the
term is used rather broadly. Any blockchain where users need permission to take
up a role are considered to be permissioned blockchains. These include applications
like Monax, where every single possible action, such as adding new users, deploying
smart contracts, requires explicit permission. On the other hand, applications such as
Quorum, where the only permission that is required is for a node to be a validator, are
also categorized as permissioned blockchains.
An extreme case of a permissioned blockchain is a private blockchain which is cen-
tralized in that write permissions are given only to a highly trusted central entity; read
permissions are available to all participants. Only chosen players are permitted to join
the network leading to a closed loop environment. Such blockchains are appropriate
for handling certain employer-employee transactions in organizations.
A widely used classification of permissioning followed is as follows.
• Simple Permissioning: Typically, permission is only required to validate new
blocks. With simple permissioning, new users may be registered by existing users,
and smart contracts may be deployed by any of the users.
• Complex Permissioning: Usually requires “fine-grained” permissions, including
being able to view the content of the blockchain, adding new users, validating
new blocks. Needless to say, the granularity of the permissions required, are a
consequence of the business model and requirements of the use case.
Privacy Models
There is variation in the privacy provided by upcoming and currently deployed private
blockchains. For any blockchain-based platform, the transactions that have been vali-
dated typically form the content of the blockchain, privacy of transactions is a part of
the privacy being provided by the platform. Permissioned blockchains typically have
three types of transactions:
• Public Transactions: Similar to transactions on public blockchains.They can be
seen by everybody on the network, and thus, can be validated by any validator.
Chapter 2. Foundations of Blockchain Technology 19
• Private Transactions: Such transactions are visible only to the parties involved in
the transaction. Consensus must be reached by all the parties involved for the
transaction to be validated. A validator present on the network but not involved
in the transaction cannot view, let alone validate the transaction.
• Group Transactions: Transactions are visible to a subset of the nodes, chosen by
the parties involved in the transaction. However, validators of the transaction are
typically the parties involved in the transaction.
Different types of permissioned blockchain applications adopt some combinations of
these three types of transactions, based on their needs. Monax, while using complex
permissioning, offers no privacy in transactions[18]. All transactions are public trans-
actions. Corda, implemented for secure communication in the financial sector, only has
private transactions, however, parties involved in the transaction may allow regulator
nodes to be involved in the consensus. Quorum is an application that provides for all
three, public, private and group transactions.
Consensus
While public blockchains require proof-of-work based consensus, which are computa-
tionally expensive, permissioned blockchains can afford to have much more computa-
tionally efficient consensus protocols, and further have varying provisions for privacy of
transactions. As a result, there is some variance in the consensus algorithm used. While
a large fraction of the permissioned blockchains currently deploy proof-of-stake min-
ing, some, like Quorum, use consensus similar to proof-of-stake, but may not provide
byzantine fault tolerance. Applications like Corda simply have private transactions,
and the parties involved must agree on the transaction to reach consensus.
Application Space
Permissioned blockchains developed as a response to the needs of enterprises to have a
private tamper-proof distributed ledger. Consequently, many of these applications are
geared towards enterprise networks, such as the banking industry and supply-chain
finance and transparency [40]. However, the applicability extends well beyond this
realm, including decentralized identity, which aims to decentralize the traditionally
centralized domain of storing potentially confidential records and letting users choose
the who is allowed to view which records.
Hyperledger
The Hyperledger project is a joint open-source effort led by a consortium of the Linux
Foundation, towards the advancement of blockchain technology. The consortium cur-
rently has more than 50 member institutions and corporates that are interested in de-
veloping the capabilities of blockchain applications. The umbrella of the Hyperledger
project, contains various projects within it, each with different flavors of blockchains.
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Hyperledger Fabric is a permissioned blockchain framework, which can be implemented,
according to the needs of the enterprise. Various components such as deploying the
consensus protocol and membership services can be chosen to be included, or not, as
per convenience [4]. The motivation behind Hyperledger Fabric is to enable enter-
prises and groups to deploy blockchains as per their own needs.
2.4 A Vast Canvas of Applications
We have seen that a well designed blockchain based platform, whether public, or pri-
vate, or permissioned, is guaranteed to be trustworthy, immutable, secure, and enables
powerful smart contracts to self-execute in an automated way. In addition, a platform
that is built upon a public blockchain is guaranteed to eliminate intermediation and
enables sharing in a decentralized and democratic way. A platform based on a permis-
sioned blockchain can also harness some of the key advantages of public blockchain
based platforms.
The numerous desirable characteristics of blockchain based systems have opened
up a wide canvas of powerful industrial and societal applications in the recent years. In
the discussion below, we first briefly describe a number of such applications in different
domains. Following that, we provide a more detailed treatment of four applications:
tamper-proof land registries, academic transcripts, crowdfunding, and a B2B supply
chain platform. This section is by no means exhaustive and the reader is urged to look
into a large number of applications covered in the following articles: [7, 8, 13, 21, 39,
42, 43]. There are many other sources in the literature and webpages which contain
a wealth of information. The references we have provided here cover only a small
fraction of content available on the web and we apologize to the authors of a large
number of articles we are unable to cite here.
Depending on the application, a certain type of blockchain will be more appropriate
than others. We have already seen the differences among public, private, and permis-
sioned blockchains; the nature of the application and the requirements mandated by
the application will decide which one of these will suit the application best.
Buoyed by the exciting application possibilities of the blockchain technology, hun-
dreds of startups have sprung up all over the world. These startups are building inno-
vative solutions in a wide variety of domains. Startups like Consensys, Storj, Ripple,
NEO, Bancor are creating solutions targeted at different industries. In India too, there
are dozens of startups which have ventured into creating smart solutions based on
blockchains.
Applications in the Financial Sector
Financial institutions in general and banking and insurance sectors in particular have
started embracing blockchain technology because of a variety of robust features that
blockchain technology provides: immutability, security, trustworthiness, and intelligent
execution of smart contracts. As one example, more than 80 of the world’s major
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financial institutions are set to use a distributed ledger platform CORDA which is a
blockchain based system developed by a prominent financial technology startup r3.
The insurance sector is also pursuing the blockchain technology aggressively. See [8],
[13], [39], and [43] for more details.
Applications in the Supply Chain and Logistics Sector
We foresee the supply chain and logistics sector to have the highest promise for a rich
variety of usecases for application of blockchain technology. Usecases such as tracking
food items from agricultural farms to customer delivery, tracking the numerous parts
of a car that will circulate through various suppliers, manufacturers, and countries,
and identifying contamination and reducing waste in perishable materials and food
processing; etc. represent examples of situations where blockchain technology is valu-
able. A startup called everledger provides a global digital ledger that tracks and pro-
tects valuable assets throughout their lifetime. The digital incarnation on blockchains
is used by various stakeholders across the supply chain to form provenance and verify
authenticity. This has been used effectively for example in tracking diamonds; more
than 1.6 million diamonds are reportedly captured in the blockchain created.
We believe an intriguing application of blockchains in the supply chain context is in
dynamic supply chain formation. Often, companies need to put together a supply chain
of partners dynamically to respond to dynamically arriving demands. This may throw
up the need to partner with unknown entities. The trust provided by the blockchain
framework provides a brilliant opportunity for partners who are unknown to one an-
other to come together and dynamically form a supply chain for the specific immediate
purpose.
IoT Based Applications
In verticals such as healthcare, smart cities, intelligent buildings, home automation,
energy industry, supply chains, and manufacturing, the application of IoT technology is
well known and well documented. In these applications, typically, hundreds and often
thousands of smart devices are connected to an Internet server or cloud, and, a variety
of analytics based services are provided. These services, however, currently suffer from
lack of scalability, challenges of security, lack of standards, high costs, and moreover are
centralized. Blockchain technology can be harnessed to provide a distributed, scalable
solution where smart devices now connect directly to distributed ledgers. Moreover,
security guarantees can be provided by robust blockchain platforms. See for example
[22] for more details.
Block Chains for Social Good
There is a wide repertoire of applications which are citizen centric and social welfare
oriented where blockchains hold significant promise. These are discussed in detail in
[8], [21], [39], [42], and [43].
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In the education sector, safe deposit of academic transcripts and educational records
is a usecase that is already being pursued by many startups and educational institu-
tions. In the healthcare area, management of electronic medical records to ensure
privacy guarantees and to enable analytics-based diagnosis, etc, are prominent exam-
ples where blockchain technology is being explored. In context of energy systems,
monitoring smart grids using a blockchain based, IoT based framework is already pop-
ular.
Blockchain technology has excellent potential for promoting ethical trade. For ex-
ample, a startup Mediledger provides blockchain solutions for pharmaceutical supply
chains. In one usecase, the blockchain systematically tracks pharma drugs from man-
ufacture to ultimate delivery by making drug companies, hospitals, distributors, and
wholesalers to record drug deliveries on the blockchain. This will enable to verify the
authenticity and provenance of the drugs, thus leading to elimination of counterfeit
drugs.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have discussed key technical ingredients of the blockchain tech-
nology and made a brief survey of its tremendous application potential. Substantial
investments have been made world over by corporations and Governments on imple-
menting blockchain technology in multiple sectors and a large number of startups have
sprung up in the past few years to harvest this technology in highly innovative ways.
There are at least two major reasons why blockchain technology will survive the
test of time. The first reason is it is deep technology founded on solid fundamental
principles and technical rigor. Such a technology will always blossom, perhaps, in a
slightly different form. The second reason is blockchain technology has the promise
and potential to touch billions of people. It has the potential to enable vast improve-
ments to existing applications and help launch radically new applications. One such
application is enabling privacy-preserving B2B collaboration.
Chapter 3
Problem Formulation and Approach
This chapter is devoted to formulating the requirements of the B2B platform
and providing a formal framework to capture, study, and analyze the inter-
actions of agents on such a platform. Further the model of the agents is pre-
sented, which forms the basis of the analysis presented in the following chapter.
The chapter concludes with a short description of the cryptographic protocols
which help fulfill the requirements of the B2B platform, and validate the as-
sumptions made in the analysis detailed in the following chapter.
3.1 Requirements of the B2B Platform
Motivation for B2B Collaboration
Online B2B platforms are almost as old as the Internet itself. Electronic Data Exchange
(EDI) brought the first wave of B2B transformation, providing significant benefits, es-
pecially, in the automotive and retail sectors [29]. However, the adoption of EDI and
related mechanisms has not progressed beyond point-to-point messages and hence, not
enabled ecosystem collaborations like supplier identification/selection, price negotia-
tion, collective quality improvement, etc [41]. Apart from cost of EDI, another reason
for the stalled progress has been the lack of a framework for collaboration which pro-
tects business sensitive information.
B2B collaboration may appear to be rather paradoxical. Expecting businesses, who
may be competitors, to cooperate, sounds implausible, however, there have been sev-
eral studies that encourage it. Collaboration amongst businesses has been shown to
be helpful in reducing supply chain costs both theoretically as well as empirically
[5, 9, 14]. Furthermore, many studies show that to ensure continued quality in the
products purchased from a strategic agent, it is necessary for all other buyers to know
when a particular seller fails to deliver good quality [12, 15].
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Roadblocks
A typical online market platform, such as Amazon, Flipkart, eBay et cetera, allows for
this by encouraging buyers to give feedback about the products they receive. Cus-
tomers on these platforms accordingly make their decision based on the price quoted
by the seller and the quality perceived from their own personal experience and the
feedback regarding that seller. Enterprise agents would also like to have such infor-
mation at hand to be able to choose the right supply chain partners [20]. However,
giving such feedback is not a straightforward matter for enterprise buyers and sellers.
Enterprise agents cannot have their identity and buying history be leaked by way of
such feedback, and anonymous feedback in itself is not completely reliable. As a re-
sult, while there is a pressing need for a Business-to-Business collaboration platform,
the sensitive nature of the information that must be exchanged on such a platform
restricts the actual development.
Components of a B2B platform
On any B2B exchange, it is common to have a group of competing manufacturers (buy-
ers) using the platform to interact with a common base of suppliers (sellers) to auto-
mate their procurement process. While they compete at an overall business level, they
would like to cooperate for purposes of rating the suppliers for their quality, timeliness,
compliance, et cetera, for collectively eliminating systemic inefficiencies. However, this
is not possible at present because the available platforms do not have any functionality
that allows collaboration without revealing business sensitive information such as who
is transacting with whom.
Permissioned blockchain networks bring the necessary levels of trust and data se-
curity along with the benefits of automation through smart contracts. There is a dire
need for combining blockchain technology’s strengths with new ideas to ensure that
agents can collaborate without revealing business sensitive information. In the con-
text of rating suppliers for their quality, this amounts to the following: the buyers are
able to collaborate in a way that they compute credible quality rating for the sellers
with the guarantee that the buyers are incentivized to be honest and without revealing
who buys from whom or what rating they have given. We achieve precisely this in our
work with a confluence of ideas from game theory, encrypted private computations,
and blockchain technology.
In this thesis, we are motivated to undertake a principled study of how the blockchain
technology facilitates better B2B collaborations across multiple networks. We propose
a novel framework for orchestrating trusted and privacy-preserving B2B collaboration
on blockchain platform. Further, we consider a prototypical example of B2B collabo-
ration for implementing supplier rating system. We show how techniques from game
theory and cryptography can be used for implementing such a system.
We formulate a simple, stylized model that captures key aspects of a collaborative
procurement process using a repeated game formulation. The motivation for choosing
such a model is that it helps to bring out the key aspects of the problem without any
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diversions of actual business process. We consider an online B2B platform on which
enterprise buyers and sellers interact repeatedly. Each seller can deliver either high
quality goods or low quality goods. It costs a seller c to produce high quality and 0 to
produce low quality. Further, the goods may be sold at a price fixed by the platform
or different sellers may adopt different pricing strategies. The procurement happens
in multiple rounds and in each round, a buyer chooses the seller to buy from. Further,
each buyer gives a binary feedback on the quality of the received supply.
If an oracle (a trusted third party with access to all the feedback), had to pub-
lish ratings for the sellers, these ratings would simply be the weighted average of the
feedback that a seller gets from different buyers across all the rounds, with more im-
portance for recent rounds. However, the assumption of a trusted third party itself is
implausible, even more so for competing enterprise agents. Consequently, we look to
blockchain technology to provide a decentralized solution.
The problem is to first design a rating system which aggregates the buyer feedback
such that:
• Only the transacting parties get to know who bought from whom in any of the
rounds, that is, it does not become public knowledge which buyer bought from
which seller in any given round;
• Sellers cannot decipher the exact feedback given about by a particular buyer
in a specific round, unless everybody has given only low feedback or only high
feedback;
• The mechanism disincentivizes the buyers from providing dishonest feedback by
means of a smart contract in place to penalize buyers suitably if feedback is found
to be dishonest.
The design of such a strategy proof market platform (or simply strategy proof mech-
anism) involves many challenges, which we solve in this thesis, by drawing upon
game theoretic analysis and smart contracts deployed on permissioned blockchains
and multi-party secure computation. To achieve the aforementioned objectives, we
propose a permissioned blockchain that implements an appropriate smart contract,
in conjunction with regulation protocols (a public perception protocol and a moni-
toring protocol). Given such a marketplace that has a blockchain infrastructure and
regulation protocols in place, we next explore different pricing rules and punishment
strategies in a game theoretic setting with the objective of identifying mechanisms that
maximize social welfare (that is, induce high quality goods to be produced most often).
3.2 A Framework for a Blockchain based B2B Platform
Having listed the requirements from the B2B platform, we introduce a formal frame-
work to model and analyze events that take place on the B2B platform, and thus on the
permissioned blockchain. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first notation used
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to formally capture the events on a blockchain-based platform. One of the purposes
of this notation is to help capture and study the information shared on the platform,
and whether any of the constraints discussed in 3.1 are violated. Another motivation
for this framework is to formally encapsulate the nature of the blockchain ledger as
a set of sequential events. An event on the blockchain may be a consequence of any
subset of prior events. The framework assumes that the blockchain is a permissioned
one. We use a permissioned blockchain setup as it helps provide a simple to implement
reputation system and additionally provides provenance to all the events and informa-
tion. The framework also provides notations for the analysis protocols deployed on
such permissioned blockchains with regards to the anonymity properties satisfied.
Let N be the set of participants (aka nodes) in a permissioned blockchain network.
Let E be the set of all transactions (aka events) that occur as a part of collaboration
between nodes in N .
For each event e ∈ E , there is an associated set of participants represented by
Ne ⊆ N ; it represents the set of participants involved with the event e.
Further, for each event e ∈ E , there is an associated record denoted by Re; this
captures the outcome of the event e. Participants in the network may have selective
access to the information about an event.
LetDh,Re denote the subset of data fields ofRe that can be accessed by the node h ∈ Ne.
Thus, Dh = ∪e∈EDh,Re is the overall data that is accessible to participant h.
We denote the union of all accessible information in the blockchain network by DU ,
i.e, DU = ∪h∈NDh.
Consider a function Γ(N , E , DU) that can be computed if there is an oracle with
access to the information DU .
Consider a protocol P which
1. Consists of an ordered set of encrypted messages S generated by the nodes in
N , and,
2. Executes a sequence of computation steps, denoted by C with each step being
carried out by a subset of nodes, where, each step may consume any subsequence
of previously generated messages.
Suppose the protocol computes a function Γ′(S, C). Conceptually, one may regard the
last step as a step carried out by a set of special monitor nodes.
The protocol P is said to be a secure and private simulation of Γ(N , E , DU) if it
satisfies the following conditions:
1. Γ(N , E , DU) ≈ Γ′(S, C)
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2. If h /∈ Ne, then, even with access to S and C , h cannot infer the exact set Ne
3. No node h ∈ N can infer any data belonging to DU \Dh
We regard, S, the set of messages generated by all the nodes, as constituting the
blockchain ledger. A B2B collaboration is essentially a sequence of computation steps
[Γi,∀i = 1, 2, . . .] We say that the collaboration can be securely and privately simulated
on the blockchain if each of the steps has a secure and private simulation protocol.
This framework is general enough to capture a host of B2B collaboration scenarios.
For our current problem, N is the set of all buyers and sellers.
Each transaction between a buyer-seller pair is represented by an event e ∈ E .
Associated with each event e is the record <price, cost, quality, rating>; the buyer
knows <price, quality, rating> while the seller knows <price, cost, quality>.
Our goal is to compute the supplier rating that closely approximates the rating that an
oracle with complete access would compute while satisfying trust and privacy issues
captured in Section 3.1.
3.3 Building Blocks of the Framework
3.3.1 The Model
We now set up the model of the procurement process to be studied.
Let B be the set of buyers and S, the set of sellers. Therefore, N = B ∪ S
Let nB and nS be the number of buyers and number of sellers, respectively. We
assume that nS > 2 and nB > 2; otherwise, irrespective of the system, anonymity
constraints can never be met. If nS < 3, then each seller knows that the buyer who
did not buy from him, chose to buy from the other seller, if any. If nB < 3, the sellers
who have made a sale know which buyer has bought from whom, as if a buyer has
not bought from him, she must have bought from the only other seller who has made
a sale. We assume that the list of sellers who have made at least one sale in a given
round is made public at the end of that round. Thus, it is imperative to assume that
both nB and nS are strictly greater than 2.
The recurring interactions are modeled as a repeated game. We formally define
repeated games in the next chapter. Each round of the repeated game takes place as
follows:
1. Each buyer selects a seller to buy from and places an order
2. Each seller decides what quality to give to which buyer
3. Based on the quality received, the buyer submits encrypted feedback
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(a) Buyers choose seller (b) Sellers decide the quality (c) Buyers submit feedback
Figure 3.1: An example round.
Red-dotted arrows and green-dashed arrows denote low and high quality respectively
The set of sellers who are making at least one sale is shared with all buyers and sellers
through a smart contract at the end of each round. The buyers then deploy the public
perception protocol, amongst themselves, for calculating the ratings of the sellers.
Each buyer b maintains a personal history vector htb which denotes the discounted
average number of times the sellers have given buyer b a high-quality product. For
those sellers, with whom the buyer has never transacted, ξ is the initial perception. ξ
is also the rating for sellers who are yet to make a sale. Thus, Q1(s) = ξ, ∀s.
htb(s) =
∑t−1
i=1 δ
t−i−1
b IQ(s, b, i) + ξ¯(s)Π
t−1
i=1(1− IT (s, b, i))∑t−1
i=1 δ
t−i−1
b IT (s, b, i) + Π
t−1
i=1(1− IT (s, b, i))
(3.1)
where IQ(s, b, i) is the indicator function of whether seller s gave buyer b a high-quality
product in round i, and IT (s, b, i) is the indicator function whether seller s sold to buyer
b in round i.
ξ¯(s) is ξ in round t if ξ ≥ Qi(s), ∀i = 1, · · · , t else is Qt(s).
We model the buyer as being somewhat optimistic in believing the initial perception
if the public perception is not as good, but once a buyer starts believing the public
perception, she does not revert to the initial perception.
The discounting factor is δb ∈ (τ, 1), τ > 0.5. This value is private information of
the buyer, and is not revealed during the game.
At the start of each round, a buyer b will compute the likelihood perceived by her
that seller s will give a high quality product in that round. She does so by taking a
weighted average of her own history with the seller, and the seller’s public perception.
This gives the buyer’s personal perception vector:
qtb(s) = θbh
t
b(s) + (1− θb)Qt(s) (3.2)
where θb is the type of the buyer, assigned by nature. θb denotes the weight that buyer
b places on her own history with a seller versus the seller’s public perception.
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Expected utility of a buyer from a seller s is
qtb(s)vH + (1− qtb(s))vL − p(s)
where p(s) is the price charged by seller s. Each buyer will choose the seller who max-
imizes her expected utility. If there are multiple such sellers, then the buyer chooses
the one who most recently gave a high-quality product if any, else chooses randomly
among them. Therefore, the first choice of seller will always be random.
For a seller, as all buyers are equivalent, we assume that a seller will always follow
the same strategy for all buyers.
Seller s has a discounting factor σs for future payoffs, which determines the strategy
chosen. Thus, choosing a payoff of p has utility p in the current round, σsp in the next
round, σ2sp in the round after that, and so on. We elaborate on this when we cover
repeated games in the next chapter.
3.3.2 Cryptographic Protocols
Based on the model defined above, we propose a Multi-Party Computation (MPC) pro-
tocol to compute the public perception vector and to ensure that the requirements
listed in 3.1 are satisfied. In order to do so, we utilize the blockchain structure and
make an additional assumption that the indicator function IT (s, i), which denotes
whether or not a seller s has made at least one sale in round i, is public knowledge to
all entities. This can easily be ensured by means of a smart contract that is deployed
across all the channels on the platform. We call the aforementioned MPC protocol as
the Regulation protocol. This protocol is deployed amongst the buyers at the end of
each round, by means of a smart contract.
The core structure of the regulation protocol is as follows:
• The protocol contains a set of monitors who together with a software entity (SE)
are responsible for identifying dishonest feedback monitor the behavior of buy-
ers.
• Each buyer shares her encrypted feedback among the buyers and they jointly
compute the components of public perception vector using homomorphic en-
cryption.
• Finally, the buyers utilize the results of the computation to obtain Qt(s).
This protocol is essential to the platform as it provides a secure method for computing
ratings for sellers, without revealing buying histories, both of which are critical for
buyers. Further, it validates the assumptions made in the analysis presented in the
next chapter. The details of this protocol are presented in Chapter 5.
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The Rating System
We now define the exact formulation of the ratings that are computed by the regulation
protocol. As mentioned earlier, if an oracle were to compute these ratings, she would
simply consider the fraction of sales made by the seller which are rated high, giving
more weight to recent rounds. We attempt to replicate these ratings in a decentralized
fashion.
The public perception of a seller s, calculated by the regulation protocol, is the
discounted average of the fraction of sales made by swhich were given a high feedback,
using random parameters. The data taken from each round is whether a seller has
made a sale in that round, and if so, what fraction of the sales were reported to be of
high-quality. The data from round i, in the current round t has weight δt−i−1M . Thus, the
most recent round has weight 1, the one before that has weight δM and so on. Rounds
in which no sales were made have weight 0. The weighted average of this data is the
rating of the seller.
The public perception vector is computed in round t as follows:
Qt(s) =
∑t−1
i=1 δ
t−i−1
M IQ(s, i) + ξΠ
t−1
i=1(1− IT (s, i))∑t−1
i=1 δ
t−i−1
M IT (s, i) + Π
t−1
i=1(1− IT (s, i))
(3.3)
where IQ(s, i) is the fraction of sales made by seller s in round i that got a feedback
of being high-quality, and IT (s, i) is the indicator function whether seller s made any
sales in round i. If seller s has not made any sale till round t then Qt(s) = ξ. The
value of δM is chosen uniformly at random from the interval (τ¯ , 1) in each round. This
interval is agreed upon by all the buyers, prior to the commencement of trading on the
market. This is done to prevent sellers from deciphering the exact feedback given for
them. As the value of δM used for all sellers is the same, there is no partisanship.
Henceforth, we use the terms ‘public perception’ of a seller and his ‘rating’ inter-
changeably.
3.4 Conclusion
A platform where enterprise buyers jointly compute the rating or reputation of the
sellers is not without constraints. The aggregation of the feedback must preserve the
anonymity of the feedback given by each agent, at the same time incentivize these
agents to be honest in their feedback. The details of the monitoring protocol which will
be deployed are covered in Chapter 5. The interactions between buyers and sellers are
further modeled as a repeated game. The outcome of these interactions under various
pricing rules is studied in the following chapter.
Chapter 4
Game Theory Based Smart Contracts
In this chapter we present the analysis of equilibrium behaviour of agents
on a B2B market platform where feedback from enterprise buyers is aggre-
gated in a privacy-preserving manner. We first cover necessary game theory
preliminaries: strategic form games in Section 4.1, extensive form games in
Section 4.2, repeated games and what punishment means in the context of the
supplier rating problem in Section 4.3. The full analysis follows these prelim-
inaries. In Section 4.4, we study the case where sellers sell at the same price,
and within this case study different punishment strategies, in order to identify
which strategy best incentivizes sellers to produce high-quality. We analyze
two other pricing rules, namely binary and continuous pricing, in Sections 4.5
and 4.6 respectively. All these cases follow the model discussed in the previous
chapter, where the procurement process is modeled as a repeated game.
4.1 Strategic Form Games and Nash Equilibrium
Game theory is a study of interactions between strategic agents that are rational and
selfish. Agents or players know the game and act to maximize their own payoff or
utility. We first define Strategic Form Games and Nash Equilibria. Definitions in this
section are taken from [31].
Definition 4.1.1. A strategic form game Γ is a tuple < N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N > where
• N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is a finite set of players
• S1, S2, · · · , Sn are the strategy sets of the players 1, 2, · · · , n
• ui : S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn → R for i = 1, 2, · · · , n are mappings called the utility
functions or payoff functions
Strategic form games assume that all players act simultaneously, with no knowledge
of what strategy other players are going to choose. We give the example of a well
known strategic form game called Prisoner’s Dilemma in Table 4.1. The game captures
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a setting where two prisoners, Anita and Bharat, are suspected of having committed a
crime and are being interrogated in separate rooms. Each of them has the option of
confessing or not confessing. If neither confesses, they both get minimal punishment
of −1 each. If only one confesses, then that person does not get punished, and the
other gets the entire punishment for the crime −10. If both confess, the punishment is
divided amongst the two and each get −5.
Anita
Confess Not Confess
B
ha
ra
t
Confess -5,-5 0,-10
Not Confess -10,0 -1,-1
Table 4.1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Clearly, the socially optimal outcome would be when neither of them confess. How-
ever, it is easy to check that whether Anita confesses or not, Bharat will be better off
confessing and vice versa. Thus, the outcome of this game, when played by rational
and selfish agents, is having both of them confess. This is because Anita’s best response
to Bharat confessing is to confess herself. A strategy profile where the strategy chosen
by each player is also their best response to all the other players’ chosen strategies is
called a Nash Equilibrium.
Definition 4.1.2 (Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium). A strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, · · · , s∗n)
is said to be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game Γ =< N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N > if
ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i), ∀si ∈ Si, i ∈ N
Thus in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, (Confess,Confess) is a Pure Strategy Nash Equi-
librium (PSNE). A strategic form game need not have exactly one PSNE. Given below
are two different strategic form games, one with two PSNE and one with none.
Dhruv
B S
C
hi
tr
a B 2,1 0,0
S 0,0 1,2
Table 4.2: Bach or Stravinsky
This game, called Bach or Stravinsky, captures a setting where two friends need to
simultaneously decide whether to attend a performance by Bach or one by Stravinsky
without consulting the other person. While Chitra prefers Bach to Stravinsky, Dhruv
prefers Stravinsky to Bach, but neither enjoy going alone. As a result, if Chitra were to
know where Dhruv is going, irrespective of which of the two strategies David chooses,
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she would do the same, and vice versa. Consequently, this game has two PSNE, namely
(B,B) and (S, S).
We now study a commonly played game called Matching Pennies. Two players,
Vandana and Kishor choose a side each. If both choose the same side, Alex wins,
otherwise Sara wins. This game is denoted as a strategic form game in Table 4.3.
Vandana
H T
K
is
ho
r
H 1,-1 -1,1
T -1,1 -1,-1
Table 4.3: Matching Pennies
It is easy to see that this game does not have a PSNE. If both choose the same side
of the coin, Vandana will want to change her choice. If they don’t Kishor will want to
change. However, if Kishor and Vandana were to choose a probability distribution with
which to choose a side, and then leave the actual choice to the toss of a private coin,
the choice of probability distribution would indicate a Mixed Strategy.
Definition 4.1.3 (Mixed Strategy). Given a player i with the set of pure strategies Si, a
mixed strategy σi of player i is a probability distribution over Si. That is, σi : Si → [0, 1]
assigns to each pure strategy si ∈ Si, a probability σi(si) such that
∑
si∈Si σi(si) = 1.
Each pure strategy of a player is also a degenerate mixed strategy. The set of all prob-
ability distributions on Si is denoted as ∆(Si), and is often called the mixed extension
of Si. Thus,
∆(Si) = {σ ∈ R|Si|+ : σi(si) = 1}
A Nash Equilibrium can be defined using mixed strategies as follows:
Definition 4.1.4 (Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium). A mixed strategy profile σ∗ =
(σ∗1, · · · , σ∗n) is said to be a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium of the strategic form game
Γ =< N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N >, if
ui(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i) ≥ ui(σi, σ∗−i), ∀σi ∈ ∆(Si), i ∈ N
All of the aforementioned games have Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria (MSNE). For the
Matching Pennies game, σi(si) = 12 ,∀si ∈ Si,∀i ∈ N is the MSNE. In fact, Nash has
proven that every finite strategic form game has a MSNE.
Theorem 4.1.1 (Nash [33]). Every finite strategic form game Γ =< N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N >
has at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
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4.2 Extensive Form Games and Subgame Perfect Equi-
librium
Strategic form games assume that players move simultaneously, with no knowledge
of the other players’ choices. However, a large class of games, such as chess, do not
belong to this paradigm and are actually played sequentially, and players may or may
not be able to observe the choice made by other players when it is their turn play their
own strategy. Extensive form games provide a framework to capture such games. The
definitions in this section have been taken from [31].
Definition 4.2.1 (Extensive Form Games). An extensive form game Γ consists of a tuple
Γ =< N, (Ai)i∈N ,H, P, (Ii)i∈N , (ui)i∈N > where
• N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is a finite set of players.
• Ai for i = 1, 2, · · · , n is the set of action available to player i (action set of i).
• H is the set of all terminal histories where a terminal history is a path of actions
from the root to a terminal node such that it is not a proper subhistory (including
the empty history ε) of all terminal histories.
• P : SH → N is a player function that associates each player subhistory to a certain
player.
• Ii for i = 1, 2, · · · , n is the set of all information sets of player i.
• ui : H → R for i = 1, 2, · · · , n gives the utility of player i corresponding to each
terminal history.
Choosing a strategy in an extensive form game doesn’t seem the same as choosing
one in a strategic form game. At different stages in the game, different actions may
be possible. Given an information set J ∈ Ii, let C(J) ⊆ Ai be the set of all actions
possible to player i in the information set J . A strategy is formally defined as follows
Definition 4.2.2 (Strategy). A strategy si of player i is a mapping si : Ii → Ai such that
si(J) ∈ C(J)∀J ∈ Ii.
Thus, a strategy maps every possible information set to an action. The strategies chosen
by all the players in the game determine the outcome of the game.
Definition 4.2.3 (Outcome). Given an extensive form game Γ and a strategy profile s =
(s1, · · · , sn) in the game, the outcome resulting from the terminal history corresponding
to the strategy profile s is called the outcome of s and is denoted by O(s).
An example of an extensive form game is given in Figure 4.1, called the Entry game. A
challenger must decide whether or not to enter a new industry and accordingly chal-
lenge the incumbent, who’s already present in the industry. If the challenger does not
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choose to enter, then the challenger and incumbent get a utility of 1 and 2 respectively.
If the challenger does enter, the incumbent must choose to either fight her or accom-
modate her. If he chooses to fight her then both get a payoff of 0 else, the challenger
gets a payoff of 2 and the incumbent a payoff of 1.
Figure 4.1: Entry Game
Definition 4.2.4 (Subgame). Given an extensive form game Γ and a non-terminal history
h, the subgame following h is the part of the game that remains after the history h has
occurred.
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium for extensive form games is defined as follows:
Definition 4.2.5. (Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE)) Given an extensive form
game Γ =< N, (Ai)i∈N ,H, P, (Ii)i∈N , (ui)i∈N >, a strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, · · · , s∗n) is
called a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium if ∀i ∈ N ,
ui(O(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i)) ≥ ui(O(si, s∗−i)), ∀si ∈ Si
Essentially, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium checks that each player’s chosen strategy
is optimal given the strategy chosen by other players, at the start of the game. It
only takes into account the terminal history that actually occurs as a result of the
strategy profile, and does not consider other subgames. If we were to do so, we would
be considering a different notion of equilibrium called Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SGPE).
Definition 4.2.6. (Subgame Perfect Equilibrium) Given an extensive form game Γ =<
N, (Ai)i∈N ,H, P, (Ii)i∈N , (ui)i∈N >, a strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, · · · , s∗n) is an SGPE if
∀i ∈ N ,
ui(Oh(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i)) ≥ ui(Oh(si, s∗−i)), ∀h ∈ {x ∈ sH : P (x) = i}∀si ∈ Si
whereOh(s∗i , s
∗
−i) denotes the outcome corresponding to the history h in the strategy profile
(s∗i , s
∗
−i).
Clearly, a PSNE is also a SGPE. The PSNE of the Entry Game are (Stay Out, Fight) and
(Enter, Accommodate). However, the only SGPE of this game is (Enter, Accommodate).
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4.3 Repeated Games
As seen earlier, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, as the agents try to maximize their
own payoff, they end up reaching an outcome that is not pareto optimal. As there
is nothing to deter them from making the selfish (and rational) choice of confessing,
they choose to do so. A strategic form game does not capture the consequences of the
decision and does not facilitate a ”threat of punishment”. To do so we study repeated
games. The definitions in this section have been adapted from [34].
Definition 4.3.1 (Repeated Game). Let Γ =< N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N > be a strategic form
game. The T -period repeated game of G for the discounting factor δ is the extensive
game with perfect information and simultaneous moves where
• N is the set of players.
• the set of terminal histories is the set of sequences (s1, s2, · · · , sT ) of action profiles
in Γ.
• P assigns the set of all players to every history (s1, s2, · · · , st) for every value t.
• the set of actions available to player i after any history is Si.
• each player i evaluates each terminal history (s1, s2, · · · , sT ) according to the dis-
counted sum
∑T
t=1 δ
t−1ui(at).
The infinitely repeated game of Γ for the discount factor δ < 1 differs only in that
the set of terminal histories is the set of infinite sequences (s1, s2, · · · ) and the utility to
each player i to the terminal history (s1, s2, · · · ) is the discounted sum ∑∞t=1 δt−1ui(at).
In a repeated game, if a player does not cooperate in one round, they may have
to face some punishment by the other players in future rounds. In the example of
Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is beneficial for both the players, if neither of them confess.
Irrespective of what strategy a player chooses, they will be worse of if the other player
decides to confess. Thus, the players can mutually agree not to confess and that if one
of the players confesses in a round, then the other will confess as punishment in future
rounds.
Typically, three types of punishment strategies in repeated games are studied:
• Grim Trigger: Under grim trigger strategies, if one player does not cooperate in
one round, then all other player will punish the defecting player in all future
rounds.
• Tit for Tat: Under tit for tat, if a player does not cooperate in a round, then she
will be punished in the next round.
• Limited Punishment: Under limited punishment, if a player does not cooperate
in a round, then she will be punished by the other players for the next k rounds,
where k is finite and fixed.
Chapter 4. Game Theory Based Smart Contracts 37
It can be shown that for the repeated game for Prisoner’s Dilemma, following Grim
Trigger/Tit for Tat/Limited Punishment form Nash equilibrium. In the presence of
such punishment strategies, whether cooperating actually becomes a Nash equilibrium
depends on the discounting factor of the players. The discounting factor of the agents
is an indicator of their patience. It determines whether agents will choose a short term
profit by defecting, or choose to get consistent gains over a long period of time by
cooperating in equilibrium.
Theorem 4.3.1. A repeated game of the strategic form game Γ will always have a Nash
equilibrium
Proof. From 4.1.1 we know that every strategic form game has a Nash equilibrium.
Clearly, the Nash equilibrium of Γ will also be a Nash equilibrium of the repeated
game of Γ. Thus, a repeated game of the strategic form game Γ will always have a
Nash equilibrium.
Determining the subgame perfect equilibrium of a repeated game is a relatively
simpler matter than doing so for general extensive games.
Definition 4.3.2 (One Deviation Property [34]). No player can increase her payoff by
changing her action at the start of any subgame in which she is the first mover, given the
other players’ strategies and the rest of her own strategy.
This property is used to determine whether a strategy profile is a subgame perfect
equilibrium for the given repeated game.
Theorem 4.3.2 (Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Games, [34]). A strategy pro-
file in a repeated game with a discount factor less than 1 is a subgame perfect equilibrium
if and only if it satisfies the one deviation property.
In our analysis, for a given pricing model and punishment model, we determine the
subgame perfect equilibria.
Punishment
When cooperation doesn’t take place in a repeated game framework, a punishment
aspect naturally comes up. In the model at hand, sellers cooperate by providing good
quality products, and buyers do so by giving honest feedback. Our framework punishes
buyers by means of the monitoring protocol and the smart contract deployed. Every
infraction by a buyer, detected by the monitoring protocol (described in the next chap-
ter), is penalized by a fee, which is the sum of the geometric progression with the first
term as the maximum utility a buyer may receive in one round and the common ratio
equal to 1− ν with ν being a positive quantity close to 0, agreed upon by all the agents
in the market prior to its commencement. The fee is chosen in this manner to try to
ensure that for providing dishonest feedback, the buyer will incur a loss greater than
any utility she can receive from further purchasing on the market. We also ensure that
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our protocol does not detect dishonesty when the buyer has given honest feedback,
thus removing any individual rationality issues.
Hence, in our framework, sellers do not actively punish the buyers, and we do not
discuss any punishment strategies for sellers. The regulation protocols ensure that
buyers will be honest. Buyers, on the other hand, can follow various punishment
strategies, in order to penalize sellers for providing bad quality goods. To this effect,
we study traditional punishment strategies, like tit for tat, which are implemented on
an individual level by buyers for having received poor quality in some recent round. We
also study punishment at a market-wide level as well, where a seller is punished by all
buyers in the market, if his public rating drops below a threshold value. Additionally,
we assume that all buyers follow the same punishment strategy. The next section
analyzes this model under different pricing rules and punishment strategies.
4.4 Analysis of Homogeneous Pricing
This is the simplest pricing model. Each seller sells her product at price p. In this
model, buyers value a high-quality product at v and a low-quality product at 0. Thus,
the payoff matrix of the buyer and seller from one single transaction becomes:
H L
Buy v − p, p− c −p, p
Table 4.4: Payoff Matrix for Homogeneous Pricing
With v > p > c > 0
This pricing rule and the rule for selecting a seller discussed in the previous chapter,
ensure that:
• As long as a seller continues to provide high quality to all his buyers, he will not
lose any buyers. The reason is that under homogeneous pricing, the price does
not change, so the selection of a seller reduces to selecting a seller who will give
the highest quality.
• If all other sellers have only given poor quality, hence have Qt(s) = 0, a seller
giving high-quality even once will be preferred henceforth, whenever he is not
being punished.
We find that these hold for both the punishment models discussed below.
Punishment Model: Local Punishment
In this model, we analyze traditionally studied punishment strategies of grim trigger,
tit for tat and limited punishment. Under these strategies, a buyer will punish a seller
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who has given her low quality products by giving a bad feedback in that round and
blacklisting for some rounds. The duration of the blacklisting is determined by the
type of strategy chosen. Punishment is given to a seller s in round t by buyer b, only if
qtb(s) > 0.
If all sellers have been blacklisted by a buyer in a round, the buyer will not make
any purchase. Thus, in our model, a buyer will choose the seller who maximizes her
expected utility, and is not being punished in that round. Thus, henceforth the strategy
chosen by buyers to select the seller in a given round will not be explicitly considered,
rather it will be considered as something that naturally follows from the punishment
model, the quality received in previous interactions and the ratings.
4.4.1 Grim Trigger Strategies
Under this punishment strategy, on receiving poor quality, a buyer blacklists the seller
for all future rounds. Thus, irrespective of the rating of other sellers, if a seller does
not cooperate with a buyer once, the buyer will not return to the seller. For a seller
to choose to cooperate with a seller, the utility of the seller for cooperating must be
more than that for not cooperating. Let H∗ denote the strategy that a seller gives out
only high quality products to all the buyers. Thus, his utility from H∗ is the sum of
the geometric progression with the first term as p − c and common ratio σs, which is
p−c
1−σs . The utility from not cooperating is p alone, as the buyer does not return in future
rounds. Thus, s will follow H∗ if
p− c
1− σs > p
⇒ c < σsp
If c > σsp then, by simply adding p− c to both sides, p > p− c+ σsp. Thus, a seller has
no incentive to delay giving low-quality. This leads us to the following theorem:
Theorem 4.4.1. Under grim trigger strategies, if c < σsp, then a seller will follow H∗,
else will give only poor quality.
4.4.2 Tit for Tat Strategies
Under these strategies, blacklisting is for exactly one round. If all sellers are following
H∗, then after the first round a seller will neither gain nor lose a buyer. After the first
round, the value of qtb(s) = 1∀s, b. To check if this is a subgame perfect equilibrium,
we need only check if a single deviation for a seller will benefit them. Assuming all
buyers are honest, if a seller s gives a low-quality product to a buyer b, b will punish
s. As the feedback is honest, buyer b will report L and s will lose all their customers
in the next round. In the next round where b does not blacklist s, as the value of hb(s)
will have dipped, b does not ever return to s. Thus, if at round i, s has n customers,
then by giving only b a low-quality product in this round, the seller will lose all the
customers in the next round, nonetheless. Thus, seller s will give out all the customers
low-quality products. Hence, seller s will deviate from H∗ if:
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p >
p− c
1− σs ⇒ c < σsp
It is easy to see that high quality offerings are driven by (a) the σsp
c
ratio and (b)
competition. Even if two sellers have c < σsp, the same reasoning will compel them to
follow H∗ in equilibrium. For a seller s, if c > σsp, there is no reason to delay giving
poor quality, and hence s will follow L∗. This leads us to the following theorem:
Theorem 4.4.2. If c < σsp, for at least two of the sellers, then the subgame perfect
equilibrium for these sellers is to follow H∗ and the others sellers to follow L∗.
We now consider when would low-quality be a subgame perfect equilibrium. If all
sellers follow L∗, then Qt(s) = 0∀t > 1 and initially buyers cycle through all sellers, till
htb(s) = 0 ∀b, s, after which each buyer randomly selects a seller in each round. Thus, a
single deviation by seller s to H will result in all buyers buying from sellers s in every
round they are not punishing s. Thus, for all sellers playing L∗ to be a subgame perfect
equilibrium, we need that for all sellers:
p+
nBpσs
nS(1− σs) > p− c+
σsnBp
(1− σ2s)
⇒ c > pσsnB
(
1
1− σ2s
− 1
nS(1− σs)
)
Thus, for L∗ to be a subgame perfect equilibrium, the only condition is:
∀s, c > pσsnB
(
1
1− σ2s
− 1
nS(1− σS)
)
In this condition, L∗ is not only an equilibrium strategy but also a dominant strategy.
The sellers have no motivation to give even a single high-quality product, even if it
means that they will get all the buyers henceforth. Hence, any seller, for whom c >
pσsnB
(
1
1−σ2s −
1
nS(1−σS)
)
, L∗ is a dominant strategy. Therefore, we have the following
theorem:
Theorem 4.4.3. If c > pσsnB
(
1
1−σ2s −
1
nS(1−σs)
)
, for a seller, then L∗ is a dominant
strategy.
We now study the case when neither H∗ nor L∗ can be a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 4.4.4. There is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium possible for homogeneous
pricing other than H∗ and L∗.
Proof. Let us consider the setting where
∀s ∈ S, pσsnB
(
1
1− σ2s
− 1
nS(1− σS)
)
> c > σsp
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If for all sellers, σs is the same, then they will follow the same strategy in equilibrium.
The analysis for this case generalizes to there being at least two sellers having the
highest value of σs. It is easy to see that as these sellers are the most patient, all the
buyers will be buying from these sellers, and the other sellers will be playing L∗.
Consider, that there is no punishment. Thus, when all sellers are playing the same
strategy, then buyers never switch from one seller to another.
Having σsp < c implies that the strategy followed cannot have only high-quality
offerings, and if pσsnB
(
1
1−σ2s −
1
nS(1−σS)
)
> c implies that only low-quality will not be
sustained.
Necessary Conditions for Equilibrium
Let (HkL)∗ be the periodic strategy where for k rounds the seller gives high-quality
then gives low-quality for one round and so on. To sustain (Hkl)∗ as an equilibrium
strategy there must be no incentive deviate from either H or L thus, to sustain this we
need to ensure that there is no incentive to deviate from H.
The incentive to deviate from H will be maximum after having given L in the
previous round. The utility at this point from a single buyer is:
1
1− σk+1s
(
(p− c)(1− σks )
(1− σs) + σ
k+1
s p
)
On deviating, s will lose all his buyers. Thus, if s deviates, he will give all buyers low-
quality. Consequently, his utility from a single buyer on deviating is p. Thus, to ensure
that there is no incentive to deviate from H, we need
1
1− σk+1s
(
(p− c)(1− σks )
(1− σs) + σ
k+1
s p
)
> p
⇒ (p− c)(1− σks ) + σk+1s p(1− σs) > p(1− σk+1s )(1− σs)
⇒ p(1− σks + σk+1s − σk+2s − ((1− σk+1s )(1− σs)) > c(1− σks )
On simplifying we get
c <
pσs(1− σk−1s + 2σks (1− σs))
1− σks
(4.1)
We also need to ensure that there is no incentive to deviate from L. The utility on
giving L is
p+
σs
1− σk+1s
(
(p− c)(1− σks )
(1− σs) + σ
k+1
s p
)
On deviating from L for even one of his current customers, all buyers, who did not
receive L in this round will buy from s in the next round. This incentive will be
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maximum when s has only one buyer. Thus, we analyze this case. On deviating from
L, the utility will be
p− c+ σsnB
1− σk+1s
(
(p− c)(1− σks )
(1− σs) + σ
k+1
s p
)
Thus, to ensure that there is no incentive to deviate from L we need:
c >
σs
1− σk+1s
(
(p− c)(1− σks )
(1− σs) + σ
k+1
s p
)
(nB − 1)
⇒ c(1− σk+1s )(1− σs) > σs((p− c)(1− σks ) + σk+1s p(1− σs))(nB − 1)
On simplifying we get
c >
pσs(1− σks + σk+1s (1− σs))(nB − 1)
(1− σk+1s )(1− σs) + σs(1− σks )(nB − 1)
(4.2)
This can be rewritten as
c >
pσs(1− σks + σk+1s (1− σs)))
x+ σs(1− σks )
(4.3)
where x = (1−σ
k+1
s )(1−σs)
nB−1
Infeasibility of Equilibrium Conditions
Hence, to have (HkL)∗ as an equilibrium strategy, we need
⇒ pσs(1− σ
k−1
s + 2σ
k
s (1− σs))
1− σks
>
pσs(1− σks + σk+1s (1− σs)))
x+ σs(1− σks )
(4.4)
⇒ (1− σ
k−1
s + 2σ
k
s (1− σs))
1− σks
>
(1− σks + σk+1s (1− σs))
x+ σs(1− σks )
(4.5)
Clearly,
(1− σks ) = (1− σs)(1− σks ) + σs(1− σks )
> (1− σs)(1− σk+1s ) + σs(1− σks ) (∵ (1− σk+1s ) > (1− σks ))
>
(1− σs)(1− σk+1s )
nB − 1 + σs(1− σ
k
s ) (∵ nB ≥ 3⇒ nB − 1 ≥ 2 > 1)
= x+ σs(1− σks )
Thus we have shown that the denominator in the LHS of 4.5 will always be strictly
greater than the denominator of the RHS.
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Now we consider the difference between the numerator of the RHS and that of the
LHS of 4.5
(1− σks + σk+1s (1− σs))− (1− σk−1s + 2σks (1− σs))
=− σks + σk+1s (1− σs)) + σk−1s − 2σks (1− σs)
=σk−1s (1 + σ
2
s(1− σs))− σks (3− 2σs)
=σk−1s (1 + σ
2
s(1− σs)− σs(3− 2σs)
=σk−1s (1 + 3σ
2 − 3σ − σ3)
=σk−1s (1− σs)3
Now, as σs ∈ (0, 1), this value will always be greater than 0. Thus, we have that the
numerator in the LHS of 4.5 will always be strictly less than the numerator of the RHS.
As a result, 4.5 will never be satisfied.
To reduce the incentive to deviate fromH, we need a higher σsp
c
ratio, and to reduce
the incentive to deviate from L we need a lower σsp
c
ratio. Consequently, (HkL)∗ will
never be a subgame perfect equilibrium, for any value of k ∈ N\0.
Considering Other Strategies
Here we have considered a setting, without punishment. Having punishment of any
form will only increase the incentive to deviate from L, and decrease the incentive to
deviate from H. Thus, even with punishment, (HkL)∗ will never be a subgame perfect
equilibrium, for any value of k ∈ N\0. Increasing the number of low-quality given, will
simply increase the incentive to deviate from L.
Let us now consider a setting where the highest value of σs is achieved by exactly
one seller, say s1. Let s1 play strategy (HkL)∗, with k ∈ N\{0}, such that k is more than
what the other sellers can sustain.
Thus, the best response of all the other sellers is to play L∗. But the best response of
s1 to all other sellers playing L∗ is to reduce the amount of high-quality. In this case the
best response of the seller with the second highest value of σs, call this seller s2, would
be to start giving H so as to have s1’s customers switch to s2, forcing s1 to increase the
amount of high-quality back to k.
Thus, there is no pure strategy equilibrium in this case.
Hence, there is no pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium when:
∀s ∈ S, pσsnB
(
1
1− σ2s
− 1
nS(1− σS)
)
> c > σsp
Along with the characterization of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria, we also
infer that competition and profit margin are major driving factors in the quality of-
fered by sellers. If at least nS − 1 sellers have c > σsp and exactly one seller has the
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highest σsp
c
ratio, then this seller has a monopoly, and will follow the strategy that max-
imizes his utility. This strategy also ensures that all buyers in the market return to him,
whenever they are not punishing him. This case is neither particularly interesting nor
practical. We now study the effect of increasing the duration of blacklisting.
4.4.3 Limited Punishment Strategies
In limited punishment, punishment is given by buyer b for receiving low-quality from
a seller s for α rounds. This implies, that the buyer will give low feedback in that very
round and for the next α rounds, the buyer will blacklist seller s.
Theorem 4.4.5. If c < σsp, for at least two of the sellers, then the subgame perfect
equilibrium for these sellers is to follow H∗ and the others sellers to follow L∗.
Proof. Similar to tit for tat, the utility from playing H∗ in any given round is p−c
1−σs . On
deviating, the seller will lose all his customers. Hence, the utility on deviating is p.
Thus, for H∗ to be a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy for s, we need
c < σsp
When at least two sellers have c < σsp, then all other sellers will play L∗.
We now characterize when giving low quality will be a SGPE.
Theorem 4.4.6. If c > pσsnB
(
1
1−σα+1s −
1
nS(1−σs)
)
, for all sellers, then all sellers playing
L∗is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. All sellers following L∗ and all buyers giving honest feedback will be a subgame
perfect equilibrium if:
p+
nBpσs
nS(1− σs) > p− c+
σsnBp
(1− σα+1s )
⇒ c > pσsnB
(
1
1− σα+1s
− 1
nS(1− σs)
)
Theorem 4.4.7. If c > pσsnB
(
1
1−σα+1s −
1
nS(1−σs)
)
, for a seller, then L∗ is a dominant
strategy.
Proof. The sellers have no motivation to give even a single high-quality product, even
if it means that they will get all the buyers henceforth. Hence, any seller, for whom
c > pσsnB
(
1
1−σα+1s −
1
nS(1−σs)
)
, L∗ is a dominant strategy.
From Theorem 4.4.4, we have that there can be no other pure strategy SGPE.
Clearly, increasing the duration of the blacklisting reduces the incentive to provide
low-quality, even in the case of monopolies, where at least nS − 1 sellers have c > σsp.
This analysis completes the characterization of subgame perfect equilibria under typi-
cal punishment strategies for repeated games. We now explore punishment strategies
implemented market-wide.
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4.4.4 Punishment Model: Threshold Punishment
In this punishment model, punishment is no longer given for every infraction, by a
single buyer. Rather, the market as a whole blacklists a seller if their public perception
falls below a threshold value for α rounds. The reason for exploring this model is,
that in the pure strategy equilibria in the local punishment model, a single infraction ,
despite having given consistent high-quality earlier, necessitated that the buyer switch
to another seller, even though the other seller is behaving identically. This is not very
practical.
The selection of the seller is still on the basis of maximization of expected utility,
based on their own estimated likelihood of getting a high-quality product. A seller is
blacklisted only if the value of Qt(s) is less than the specified threshold. A blacklisted
seller is reintroduced to the market after α rounds with the threshold value as his
rating.
For homogeneous pricing, we set the threshold value as that below which the ex-
pected utility would be negative. Thus, the threshold for homogeneous pricing is p/v.
Analysis similar to that of the always punish model helps us find the subgame perfect
equilibria.
Theorem 4.4.8. If c < σsp, for at least two of the sellers, then the subgame perfect
equilibrium for these sellers is to follow H∗ and the others sellers to follow L∗.
Proof. Similar to local punishment, the utility from playing H∗ in any given round is
p−c
1−σs .On deviating, the seller will lose all his customers. Hence, the utility on deviating
is p. Thus, for H∗ to be a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy for s, we need
c < σsp
When at least two sellers have c < σsp, then all other sellers will play L∗.
Theorem 4.4.9. If c > σspnB
(1−σα+1s )
(
1− σα+1s
nS
)
, for a seller, then L∗ is a dominant strategy.
Proof. All sellers following L∗ and all buyers giving honest feedback will be a subgame
perfect equilibrium if:
p+
nBpσ
α+2
s
nS(1− σα+1s )
> p− c+ σsnBp
(1− σα+1s )
⇒ c > σspnB
(1− σα+1s )
(
1− σ
α+2
s
nS(1− σs)
)
From Theorem 4.4.4 we have that there is no other SGPE.
Let us now compare the bounds established by limited punishment and threshold
punishment to find which model disincentivizes low quality better.
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Theorem 4.4.10. Threshold Punishment model disincenitvizes low-quality offerings bet-
ter than Local Punishment.
Proof. For threshold punishment we need c > σspnB
(1−σα+1s )
(
1− σα+1s
nS
)
, for L∗ to be a domi-
nant strategy. For limited punishment, we need c > pσsnB
(
1
1−σα+1s −
1
nS(1−σs)
)
.
Consider,
σspnB
(1− σα+1s )
(
1− σ
α+1
s
nS
)
− pσsnB
(
1
1− σα+1s
− 1
nS(1− σs)
)
=σspnB
(
1
(1− σα+1s )
(
1− σ
α+1
s
nS
)
−
(
1
1− σα+1s
− 1
nS(1− σs)
))
=
σspnB
(1− σα+1s )(nS(1− σs))
(
nS(1− σs)− σα+2s − (1− σα+1)
(
nS(1− σs)
1− σα+1s
− 1
))
=
σspnB
(1− σα+1s )(1− σα+1s )(nS(1− σs))
(
nS(1− σs)− σα+2s − (1− σα+1)(nS(1− σs)− 1 + σα+1s )
)
=
σspnB
(1− σα+1s )(1− σα+1s )(nS(1− σs))
(
1− σα+1s + σα+2s − σ2α+2s
)
>0 (∵ σspnB
(1−σα+1s )(1−σα+1s )(nS(1−σs)) > 0 and 1− σ
α+1
s + σ
α+2
s − σ2α+2s > 0)
Thus, we infer that threshold punishment model is comparatively better for disin-
centivizing poor quality. Consequently, we conclude that for homogeneous pricing,
threshold punishment is the most conducive to inducing high quality offerings from
sellers.
It is also important to note that while all sellers selling at the same price is a useful
building block for further analysis, it is not very pragmatic. We do not see different
qualities of the same product being traded at the same price. Thus, we now explore
heterogeneous pricing.
4.5 Analysis with Binary Pricing
We now take into consideration real-world markets, where sellers of the same product
may either belong to a high-price category or low-price category. The price category to
which the seller belongs to is often an indicator of the quality of the product provided
by him. We abstract this situation into the binary pricing model as follows.
We assume that each buyer has value vL and vH for low and high-quality respec-
tively, with vH > vL > 0.
In this model, goods can be sold at either pH or pL, with the cost of producing a
high and a low-quality good as c and 0 respectively.
We assume
• pH > pH − c > pL > pL − c > 0
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• vH − pL > vH − pH > vL − pL > 0 > vL − pH .
Let SH and SL be the set of sellers selling at pH and pL respectively. Thus, S = SH ∪SL.
Let nH = |SH | and nL = |SL|.
We consider only the threshold punishment model as it tends to induce the L∗
equilibrium less than the always punish model, as shown in the previous section.
The threshold for sellers in SH is pH/vH , similar to the homogeneous pricing model,
the threshold for sellers in SL is  such that 0 <  << 1 and is introduced to demotivate
L∗ becoming an equilibrium strategy.
Within binary pricing we consider two pricing models:
1. Non-adaptive binary pricing: The sets SH and SL do not change and
2. Adaptive binary pricing: The prices charged by the sellers depend on their public
perception.
We show that given the parameters of the system, both of these pricing rules reduce to
different cases of homogeneous pricing.
4.5.1 Non-adaptive Binary Pricing
This models markets where the prices offered by a seller are consistent over time. On
analysis, we find that this pricing rule reduces to different instances of the homoge-
neous pricing model, under different conditions.
Throughout the game, sellers in SH charge pH , and those in SL charge pL. In this
model, we assume initial perception of a seller, ξ to be the same irrespective of the price
charged. Thus, initially, as the estimated likelihood of getting a high-quality product is
the same for all sellers, in the first round, a buyer randomly chooses a seller in SL.
Buyers expect a utility of ξvH + (1− ξ)vL − pH from sellers in SH . Thus, as long as
at least one seller in SL has expected utility at least ξvH + (1 − ξ)vL − pH then buyers
never buy from a seller in SH .
If c < σspL for at least two sellers in SL, then the buyers get a utility of vH−pL from
these sellers and will continue to buy from these sellers. Similarly, any equilibrium
which gives a utility of at least ξvH + (1 − ξ)vL − pH can be sustained, and no buyer
will ever buy from a seller in SH .
If a seller in SL cannot sustain a strategy that gives the buyers a utility of at least
ξvH + (1− ξ)vL− pH then they give out L from the very first round. In the case that all
sellers in SL are in this state, only then buyers will proceed to buy from sellers in SH .
Thus, once buyers start buying from sellers in SH as long as at least one of the
sellers can give an expected utility of at least vL− pL, buyers will continue to buy from
sellers in SH else will switch back to sellers in SL and never again buy from sellers in
SH . All sellers who cannot sustain a strategy which guarantees an expected utility of
vL − pL and avoids going into isolation will follow L∗.
If the buyers switch from buying from sellers in SH to buying from sellers in SL, the
game reduces to that of the homogeneous pricing model with threshold punishment.
The results are summarized in the following table
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Condition Homogeneous Pricing Parameters
∃s ∈ SL can sustain ≥ ξvH + (1− ξ)vL − pH S = SL, p = pL
∃s ∈ SH can sustain ≥ vL − pL S = SH , p = pH
@s ∈ SH can sustain ≥ vL − pL S = SL, p = pL
Table 4.5: Results of Non-Adaptive Binary Pricing
4.5.2 Adaptive Binary Pricing
We now model markets where prices are not consistent over time, such as with new
technology. Initially, all sellers charge a high price in order to indicate quality, but
may later reduce the price. We abstract this situation into an adaptive binary pricing
model. The sellers switch their states based on their rating. All sellers start at price
pH . If Qt(s) < pHvH the seller is isolated for α rounds, after which the seller joins SL and
charges pL, with Qt(s) = max(, Qt−α−1(s)). The seller is upgraded to price pH once
the estimated utility, based on the rating crosses vH−pH , thus when Qt(s) ≥ 1− pH−pLvH−vL .
The reason for having all sellers start at the same price, is that if sellers cannot sustain
giving high-quality at a higher price, they will not be able to do so at a lower price.
Figure 4.2: Adaptive Binary Pricing: Price update Rule
All those sellers who cannot sustain a strategy which avoids isolation will follow L∗. If
there is at least one seller who can avoid isolation, then the game reduces to homoge-
neous pricing at pH with the sellers who can avoid isolation.
If there are no such sellers, then the game reduces to that of homogeneous pricing
at price pL with all the sellers. Thus we have,
Condition Homogeneous Pricing Parameters
∃s ∈ S who can avoid isolation S = SH , p = pH
@s ∈ S who can avoid isolation S = SL, p = pL
Table 4.6: Results of Adaptive Binary Pricing
As both the pricing rules in binary pricing reduce to various cases of homogeneous
pricing, we choose not to explore other discrete pricing models with more prices as
such models will not achieve anything more than exploding the state space.
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A consequence of the two pricing rules reducing to different cases of homogeneous
pricing is:
• As long as a seller continues to provide high quality to all his buyers, he will not
lose any buyers.
• If all other sellers are only giving poor quality, a seller giving high-quality even
once will be preferred henceforth, whenever he is not being punished.
This would not be found in a continuous pricing model, where with even small changes
in rating, the price charged changes.
4.6 Analysis with Continuous Pricing
We assume that each buyer has value vL and vH for low and high-quality respectively,
with vH > vL > 0.
In this model the price charged by a seller is contingent on the public perception
of the seller. We choose to linearly scale the public perception of a seller to the range
[pL, pH ] to determine the price. That is, seller s will charge in round t:
pL + (pH − pL)Qt(s)
Under this model, we observe immediate changes in prices even with minor changes
in the public perception, bringing about behavior not found in the pricing models
discussed earlier. The behavior shown by a buyer, b in this model depends also on
her type, θb, which was not observed in the preceding analysis. Contrary to previous
results, in the continuous pricing model, we find that preferring a seller with rating 1
over one with lesser rating is not necessary. Nor is it the case that, if all other sellers
were only giving low quality, to all their buyers, and a seller were to give high quality
to even a fraction of his buyers, in the next round, all buyers would choose to buy from
him.
Theorem 4.6.1. If a buyer b has to choose between sellers s1 and s2, in round t, where
htb(s1) = Q
t(s1) = 1 and htb(s2) = 1 − φ and Qt(s2) = 1 − , with φ ≥ 0 and  > 0, she
will choose s1 if
θb
(
1− φ

)
< 1−
(
pH − pL
vH − vL
)
Proof. It is easy to see that qtb(s1) = 1 and q
t
b(s2) = θb(1 − φ) + ((1 − θb)(1 − )) =
1− ((1− θb) + θbφ). Let β = (1− θb) + θbφ
The price charged by s1 is pH and by s2 is pL + (1− )(pH − pL) = pH − (pH − pL)
If b must choose s1 over s2, the utility b expects from s1 must be greater than what she
expects from s2. Thus, we need:
vH − pH > (1− β)vH + βvL − pH + (pH − pL)
Chapter 4. Game Theory Based Smart Contracts 50
=⇒ β(vH − vL)− (pH − pL) > 0
=⇒ ((1− θb) + θbφ)(vH − vL)− (pH − pL) > 0
=⇒ (pH − pL)
(vH − vL) < (1− θb) + θbφ
=⇒ (pH − pL)
(vH − vL) < (1− θb) + θb
φ

∴ θb
(
1− φ

)
< 1−
(
pH − pL
vH − vL
)
Theorem 4.6.2. If a buyer b has to choose between sellers s1 and s2, in round t, where
htb(s1) = Q
t(s1) = 0 and htb(s2) = φ and Q
t(s2) = , with phi ≥ 0 and  > 0, she will
choose s2 if
θb
(
1− φ

)
< 1−
(
pH − pL
vH − vL
)
Proof. It is easy to see that qtb(s1) = 0 and q
t
b(s2) = θbφ+(1−θb). Let β = (1−θb)+θbφ.
The price charged by s1 is pL and by s2 is pL + ()(pH − pL). If b must choose s2 over
s1, the utility b expects from s2 must be greater than what she expects from s1. Thus,
we need, vL− pL < (1− β)vH + βvL− pH + (pH − pL). From analysis similar to above,
we get:
θb
(
1− φ

)
< 1−
(
pH − pL
vH − vL
)
These results capture following
• If the buyer does not give much importance to public perception, a change in the
public perception is more significant in the change in price than in quality.
• If the value of pH−pL
vH−vL is very close to 1, then a buyer is almost indifferent to quality
and would prefer to save on the price.
• If the change in the quality delivered by the seller to the buyer as at least as much
as that in the public perception, then the buyer will always prefer better quality
Let us now characterize how buyers will choose between two sellers in this pricing
model.
Given two sellers s1 and s2 and a buyer b.
Let htb(s1) = φ1 and h
t
b(s2) = φ2, and Q
t(s1) = 1 and Qt(s2) = 2.
Thus, qtb(s1) = θbφ1 + (1− θb)1 and qtb(s2) = θbφ2 + (1− θb)2.
Let Etb(s) denote the utility b expects from seller s in round t.
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∴ Etb(s1) = (θbφ1 + (1− θb)1)vH + (1− θbφ1 − (1− θB)1)vL − 1pH − (1− 1)pL
(4.6)
= (vH − vL)(θbφ1 + (1− θb)1) + (vL − pL)− 1(pH − pL) (4.7)
Similarly
Etb(s2) = (vH − vL)(θbφ2 + (1− θb)2) + (vL − pL)− 2(pH − pL) (4.8)
For b to choose s1 over s2, we need
Etb(s1) > E
t
b(s2)
(vH − vL)(θb(φ1 − φ2) + (1− θb)(1 − 2))− (1 − 2)(pH − pL) > 0 (On simplifying)
Let 1 > 2, then on dividing by (1 − 2), we have
(vH − vL)
(
θb
(
φ1 − φ2
1 − 2 − 1
)
+ 1
)
− (pH − pL) > 0
⇒ 1− pH − pL
vH − vL > θb
(
1−
(
φ1 − φ2
1 − 2
))
Thus, we have that if 1 > 2, b will choose s1 over s2 if 1− pH−pLvH−vL > θb
(
1−
(
φ1−φ2
1−2
))
Else, if 1 < 2, b will choose s1 over s2 if 1− pH−pLvH−vL < θb
(
1−
(
φ1−φ2
1−2
))
Clearly, if 1 = 2 b will choose s1 over s2 if φ1 > φ2.
Let β = pH−pL
vH−vL . βnB is the expected number of customers for whom θb > 1−
(
pH−pL
vH−vL
)
,
and thus may value price over the quality.
Based on this analysis, we derive the following table of the expected number of
buyers in the following round based on the strategy chosen in the current round and
previous history, given there is exactly one other seller playing H∗. Let bt(s) be the
number of buyers seller s has in round t
History Strategy Expected Customers in t+ 1
Anything H∗ bt(s)
H∗ HkLb
t(s)−k β(nb + k − bt(s))
Not H∗ HkLbt(s)−k k
We observe that even for buyers, for whom θb > 1 −
(
pH−pL
vH−vL
)
, having received low-
quality from a seller, the buyer never return to this seller, as long as there is a seller
giving better quality. The behavior described above also severely limits the analysis
possible in this pricing model. No closed form expressions are found for the analysis
for equilibrium behavior. This concludes our exploration of different pricing models.
We now list the details of our regulation protocols which form the backbone of our
model.
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Implementation
The analysis presented in this chapter relies on the existence of a B2B market platform
as described in the previous chapter. The assumptions made are supported by available
blockchain technology. A typical blockchain fabric like Hyperledger Fabric ([4]) can be
used to implement the proposed system. It has a concept of channels where data and
ledger is shared across participants in the channel.
In the case studied in this thesis, a particular seller and buyer pair will be part of
one private channel, that is a B2B network. However, a buyer or a seller may be part
of multiple such channels, with different agents. Transactional privacy is maintained
across blockchain channels, that is, across different B2B networks. All data related
to the channel, such as channel information, member, transaction, et cetera, is not
accessible by anyone not explicitly granted access to that channel. Further, a “meta”
channel, consisting of all buyers and sellers, will help facilitate computation of reliable
ratings. On top of these multiple channels, the deployment of inter-channel smart con-
tracts is possible. Such smart contracts, which enforce pricing rules and punishment
strategies, and compute reliable ratings, together form the B2B market platform.
4.7 Conclusions
Repeated games enable us to model punishment. In our case, there is a monitoring
protocol in place to ensure that the buyer is honest, thus punishment only applies to
sellers. The local punishment model captures traditional punishment strategies, where
punishment is given for every single infraction. The threshold punishment model gives
punishment is given market-wide, on the rating having dropped below a certain thresh-
old. We find that over local punishment, threshold punishment is able to better disin-
centivize poor-quality offerings from the sellers. An advantage of the threshold punish-
ment rule is that it can be enforced using smart contracts. In fact, as discussed earlier,
the very purpose of the analysis presented in this chapter is to be able to design smart
contracts that enforce conditions which best incentivize the enterprise sellers to deliver
high-quality. The smart contracts deployed can enforce particular seller selection rules,
punishment strategies as well as regulate the prices charged by a seller. Consequently,
this chapter presents the various equilibria that surface under different pricing rules.
While the case where all sellers sell at the same price may seem unrealistic, it is
found that whenever the price charged by a seller does not change with a small change
in the rating, the system reduces to a case of homogeneous pricing. When, the price
charged by a seller does in fact change with even minute changes in the seller’s rating,
buyers may switch to a seller with a lower rating than the one they were previously
buying from. This may be a consequence of the buyer having little value for the public
perception of a seller. However, if any buyer were to receive low-quality herself, she
will never return to that seller, as long as there is another seller having a rating at least
as high. The protocol deployed to actually compute these ratings from the buyers’
feedback vectors is detailed in the following chapter.
Chapter 5
Cryptographic Regulation Protocols
This chapter elaborates on the cryptographic regulation protocols deployed on
the platform that fulfill the privacy requirements of B2B platform. We describe
in particular, two subprotocols, namely the Monitoring Protocol and the Public
Perception Protocol which facilitate the interactions discussed previously using
public key schemes and homomorphic encryption.
5.1 Cryptographic Protocols: Some Preliminaries
Since the beginning of civilization, but even more so since the advent of the Internet,
all entities are associated with information. Some information can be made publicly
available whereas some must be deemed private. With online computations gaining
prominence, often the need arises to communicate securely and compute on sensitive
and private data of various entities. Clearly non-trivial, the goal of secure communi-
cation is well stated and understood. Encryption schemes play a vital role in securing
data transfer. Efficient encryption schemes have been designed over the years to tackle
the problem of secure communication. However, cryptographic community these days
focuses on problems that are well beyond the problem of securing the data in transit.
Cryptography has evolved over the years to tackle the problem of keeping the data
private as well as performing computation on it.
In essence, the field of cryptography can be broadly classified into two classes: sym-
metric key cryptography and public key cryptography. Particularly in the encryption
paradigm, symmetric key algorithms use a single key for both encryption of a message
and its decryption whereas public key algorithms allow use of two keys: a public-key
which is distributed widely is used to encrypt a message and a corresponding secret
key, known only to the owner is used to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the underly-
ing message. For communication involving large number of parties, a public-key based
approach seems more plausible since symmetric key based schemes require exchange
of pairwise keys between every pair of parties.
In this section, we describe the necessary primitives required for the construction of
our cryptographic protocol that aims at secure computation of public perception vector
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and monitoring of feedback. We assume pairwise authentic channels are available
between the parties for communication.
Public Key Encryption: A public key encryption scheme is defined using the tuple
of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms key generation, encryption and decryption
indicated as (Gen, Enc, Dec) respectively satisfying:
• Gen: (pk, sk) ← Gen(1κ). The key generation algorithm Gen takes as input
security parameter κ and generates a key pair (pk, sk) where pk is the public key
and sk is the secret key. This is a randomized algorithm.
• Enc: c← Enc(m, pk). The encryption algorithm Enc takes as input the plaintext
message m ∈ M, whereM is the message space and public key, pk to generate
a ciphertext c ∈ C, where C is the ciphertext space.This is also a randomized
algorithm.
• Dec: m = Dec(c, sk). The decryption algortihm Dec takes as input the ciphertext
c and secret key sk to obtain the corresponding plaintext m or special symbol ⊥
denoting decryption failure. This is usually a deterministic algorithm.
Homomorphic Encryption: An homomorphic encryption scheme [16] pi is defined
using a tuple of four algorithms (KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Evaluate) with the first
three algorithms performing usual operations and the algorithm Evaluate takes as in-
put the public key pk, a circuit C from a set of permitted circuits and a tuple of cipher-
texts c=(c1, c2, ..., cn) corresponding to plaintexts (p1, p2, ..., pn) to obtain a ciphertext c′
which on decryption produces the plaintext p′ = C(p1, p2, ..., pn). We denote it as:
c′ ← Evaluate(pk, C, c)⇒ C(p1, p2, ..., pn) = Decrypt(sk, c′)
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE): The scheme pi is fully-
homomorphic if it is homomorphic for all circuits [16]. Given a set of ciphertexts
(c1, c2, ..., cn) encrypted under a public key, an encryption that supports any joint com-
putation on these ciphertexts to obtain a ciphertext C = f(c1, c2, ..., cn), where f is a
polytime computable function is called a fully homomorphic encryption. No informa-
tion about the individual ciphertexts, C or any intermediate values should be leaked
during computation. By default, homomorphic cryptosystems are malleable.
Protocol via Threshold FHE:[1] This is a protocol that allows multiparty computa-
tion using FHE. It consists of a key generation protocol where all the parties involved
collaboratively agree on a common public key of an FHE scheme and each party also
receives a share of the secret key. The parties can then encrypt their individual inputs
under the common public key, evaluate the desired function homomorphically on the
ciphertexts, and collaboratively execute a decryption protocol on the result to learn the
output of the computation. We can categorize the scheme to consist of:
• Threshold Key Generation.
• Encryption and Evaluation.
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• Threshold decryption.
It is possible to convert any FHE scheme into TFHE by efficient implementation of the
key-generation and decryption protocols.
We also define a variant via Threshold FHE using Multi-key FHE (MFHE) [28] which
can be used for our protocols as follows:
1. Each party individually chooses its own MFHE key pair (pki, ski), encrypts its
input xi under pki, and broadcasts the resulting ciphertext. At the end of this
round, each party can homomorphically compute the desired function f on the
received ciphertexts and derive a common multi-key ciphertext which encrypts
the output y = f(x1, ..., xn). Note that no individual party or incomplete set of
parties can decrypt this ciphertext and so the privacy of the input is maintained.
2. The parties run a secure distributed protocol for ”threshold decryption” using
their secret keys ski to decrypt the multi-key ciphertext and recover the output y
in plaintext.
Zero Knowledge Proofs: Zero knowledge proof (refer [2, 17, 37] for literature) is a
technique by which a party (prover) can prove the knowledge of a statement x to an-
other party (verifier) without revealing any other information apart from the fact that
she knows x. Any zero-knowledge proof must satisfy three properties. We informally
define them as follows:
• Completeness: If the statement x is true, then by this property, an honest verifier
will be convinced of the fact that the statement is true by an honest prover.
• Soundness: If the statement x is not true, then a cheating prover cannot convince
an honest verifier that x is true except with negligible probability.
• Zero knowledge: Nothing but the truth of the statement is learnt by the verifier.
Zero knowledge proof systems can be interactive or non-interactive in nature. Non-
interactive zero-knowledge is a variant of zero-knowledge proof where no interaction
is necessary between a prover and a verifier. To accomplish the goal, both the prover
and the verifier agree on a common reference string. A common reference string is an
assumption that it is a trusted setup taken from some distribution that is commonly
shared by all parties involved in the protocol.
We consider our public encryption scheme to be CPA-secure (security against chosen-
plaintext attack (CPA)). For more details on security of public key encryption schemes,
the reader is referred to [25]. We consider the protocol with threshold FHE scheme
of [1] to explain the public perception protocol. It can be instantiated with Learning
With Errors (LWE) assumption.
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5.2 Monitoring Protocol
Dishonesty needs to detected by a monitor when a buyer being observed does not
behave as expected from her feedback history and the ratings. A monitor knows the
rule deployed by buyers for selecting sellers and has access to the public perception
vector Qt. If the buyer’s ratings are honest, then they are the same as her personal
history. Hence, if the feedback is honest, the monitor can correctly predict which seller
the buyer should choose to buy from in the following round. If this prediction proves to
be incorrect, it would indicate that the buyer has been dishonest. The detailed protocol
is as follows:
1. Each monitor entity Pi involved in the system has public key pki and secret key
ski associated with it.
2. We consider a distinguished set of monitors who are honest and constantly mon-
itor the behavior of the buyers for any corrupt behavior. Each monitor is associ-
ated with one buyer.
3. To protect the anonymity of the buyers, the SE chooses an alternate ID for each
buyer and sends a copy of it to the corresponding buyer. Buyers use their alter-
nate ID for simplified communication. The SE acts as an intermediary between
the buyer and her corresponding monitor, i.e., the SE has knowledge of the as-
sociation between the actual ID and alternate ID of each buyer. The monitor
obtains the alternate ID of the buyer that it is monitoring and has no information
about the underlying buyer.
4. Pseudonymity of Parties:We allow the Software Entity to sample a random ID
for each buyer involved in the computation. This is to enable ease of communica-
tion. The SE directs each buyer to include the random ID sampled as part of the
message sent to the monitor i.e., both the random ID and the encrypted feedback
are together sent to each monitor by the corresponding buyer. This allows the
monitor to use the ID to report to the SE about any dishonest behaviour of the
buyer.
5. Every feedback given by the buyer b is encrypted and sent using the public key
of its corresponding monitor m as directed by the SE. The resulting ciphertext
is decrypted by the monitor m using its secret key to obtain the feedback in
decrypted form for monitoring.
6. A monitor constantly observes its buyer’s feedback after every purchase. If the
observed behavior does not match with the feedback given by the buyer and the
public perception, the monitor informs the SE about the buyer using the alternate
ID and the SE publicly identifies the corrupt buyer using the actual ID of the buyer
as it knows the association between the IDs.
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5.3 Public Perception Protocol
The purpose of the monitoring protocol is to ensure that the public perception vector
computed is reliable. We now describe how this vector is computed, while preserving
the anonymity of buyer feedback. This protocol is run amongst all the buyers on the
platform. The SE also chooses a random value for δM necessary in each round i needed
for public perception vector operations. We assume that the value δM and trusted setup
(common reference string) necessary for key generation in threshold FHE is generated
and distributed by the software entity.
1. All buyers involved in the computation run the threshold Key Generation proto-
col of threshold fully homomorphic encryption ([1]) to obtain their corresponding
public key and private key (pki, ski) pair.
2. The public keys of all the buyers are consolidated as part of the key generation
protocol to obtain the common public key pk∗ that will be used to perform ho-
momorphic encryption and operation on the encrypted data homomorphically.
3. Each buyer bj, j ∈ [nB] consolidates her feedback for the sellers using a vector
vbj=(fs1 , · · · , fsnS ) where fs1 , · · · , fsnS indicate the feedback values correspond-
ing to all nS sellers s1, ..., sn respectively. The feedback is -1 for low and 1 for
high if bj made a purchase from sj. Otherwise, fsj = 0.
4. Each buyer bj encrypts her feedback vector vbj using the consolidated public key
pk∗ to obtain the ciphertext cbj and sends this encrypted feedback to all the other
buyers. bj, j ∈ [nB] also provides a zero knowledge proof ( [2, 17, 37]) that the
feedback input provided to compute public perception vector is the same as the
one provided for monitoring purposes. The rest of the buyers as well as the SE
work together as validators to ensure that the two vectors sent are the same.
5. Buyers homomorphically consolidate the vectored ciphertexts cbj as rows in order
to compute the matrix F .
6. To separate the positive and negative feedback, the following operations are per-
formed:
Fhigh =
1
2
(F + |F |)
Flow =
1
2
(|F | − F )
7. Here |F | denotes the matrix F with absolute values of the entries. The resulting
matrices Flow and Fhigh contain 1-entries (in encrypted form) at positions where
the feedback is low and high respectively.
8. Obtaining each column sum of Flow would give the sum of all sales made by
corresponding seller with feedback of −1 denoted as sumplow, p ∈ [nS] and each
column sum of Fhigh would give the sum of all sales made by the corresponding
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seller with feedback of 1 denoted as sumphigh, p ∈ [nS]. Total sales made by each
seller sp is obtained as:
sumsp = sum
p
low + sum
p
high
Thus, IQ(s, i) = sum
p
high/sumsp is obtained in encrypted form.
9. Buyers together perform distributed threshold homomorphic decryption to obtain
the IQ vector for round i.
10. Each buyer locally computes the public perception vector Qt, using δM obtained
from SE and verifies with other buyers that the resulting values are consistent,
through consensus on the blockchain. SE chooses δM randomly in each round,
from (τ¯ , 1).
This protocol may be instantiated using the threshold multi-key fully homomorphic
encryption schemes that utilize separate public key and secret keys held by the parties
as well. Besides the scheme described above, we could adopt an alternative approach
of using a smart contract amongst the buyers in the market, where each buyer sub-
mits their encrypted feedback, receives the IQ(s, i) vector in encrypted form and then
decrypts it as in step 6 of the protocol.
5.4 Properties of the Protocols
The regulation protocols discussed above ensure the anonymity constraints are met in
all cases except a few corner cases.
Anonymity of Buying Patterns
The monitoring protocol does not reveal buying patterns. Each monitor is mapped
to exactly one buyer whose identity is concealed from the monitor. As a result, the
monitor can only decipher that a particular seller made a sale in that round, which is
always publicly known. Feedback vectors are always sent in an encrypted format. It is
ensured that whenever this encrypted vector is received from a known party, the vector
cannot be decrypted by a single party.
The cases in which a buying pattern may become public is the case when exactly
one or two sellers have made a sale in a given round. In the case that there are exactly
two sellers who have made any sales, only these sellers are able to decipher who bought
from whom. These two corner cases are unfortunately unavoidable in our framework.
Anonymity of Feedback
Despite monitors having access to the feedback vectors, anonymity is preserved, as the
monitors remain unaware of the identity of the buyers whose feedback they monitor.
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The feedback used in the public perception protocol is encrypted and aggregated ho-
momorphically. As a result, buyers have no access to the feedback vector of any other
buyer. The only case in which the feedback may be revealed to the seller is when his
rating is either 0 or 1. This would be a consequence of all buyers giving the same
feedback. These two corner cases, unfortunately are unavoidable with in our setup.
The only way to circumvent this situation would be to introduce a random offset in the
ratings, which would make the system less reliable and introduce non-deterministic
behavior.
5.5 Conclusions
Using homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge proof as primitives, a regulation
protocol composed of the monitoring protocol and the public perception protocol was
defined. The regulation protocol provides the final building block required to facili-
tate a trusted reputation system amongst enterprise agents. The monitoring protocol
ensures that buyers are honest in the feedback they provide and thus, the ratings com-
puted are reliable. The public perception protocol computes the ratings while preserv-
ing the anonymity of the feedback. The protocols presented in this chapter aim to show
the feasibility of achieving the requirements of a B2B platform, but do not claim to be
the optimal way to do so. The enterprise procurement process, is a long one, where
purchases are made every few months. Thus, inefficiency of time can be well tolerated
in such systems.

Chapter 6
Summary and Future Work
6.1 Summary
This thesis presented a novel foray into the study of the intersection of game theory and
blockchains. While blockchains are far too recent, for anything to be truly ‘traditional’,
the traditional view of the relevance of game theory to blockchains was with regards
to mining and cryptoeconomic incentives. To the best of our knowledge, the work
presented in this thesis is the first to use game theory to design smart contracts.
This thesis first presented an overview of blockchains and blockchain technology in
Chapter 2. Starting with the building block of blockchains, covering the data structure,
organization and storage of the contents of the blockchain, along with a brief overview
of mining and some of its commonly followed techniques. Key features of blockchain
technology were discusses, how the blockchain functions as an asset ledger, along with
the basics of smart contracts. To conclude the overview of blockchains, a common
classification of blockchains into permissionless (public) and permissioned (private)
blockchains, was discussed, along with the various issues associated with both.
Contributions
In this thesis, we designed a blockchain-based market platform, which allows for B2B
collaboration, discussed in Chapter 3. This platform is intended for the enterprise
procurement process. Enterprises would like to choose buy their required goods from
the seller, who is most likely to give them high-quality. In order to do so, they need
both their own personal experience, along with reviews of other enterprise buyers. To
serve this purpose, the market platform allows buyers to buy from the seller of their
choice and consequently give feedback on the quality they received, so as to rate the
corresponding seller.
The collection and aggregation of this feedback also has constraints. As businesses
cannot afford have their buying history leaked, for fear of revealing business strategy
to rivals, the feedback must be collected such that the identities of the buyers are
not revealed. Further, it is necessary to ensure that sellers are not decipher the exact
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feedback given by a specific buyer in a particular round. This level of anonymity can
induce a buyer to be strategically dishonest about her feedback regarding a certain
seller, so as to induce that seller to give high-quality, in an effort to increase his ratings,
or reduce his selling price. Thus, an additional requirement, along with complete
anonymity of the feedback is that buyers are incentivized to be honest.
Regulation Protocol
These requirements were met through cryptographic protocols deployed in the form of
blockchains on the platform by way of smart contracts. These protocols are detailed
in Chapter 5. There are essentially two sub-protocols, the monitoring protocol and the
public perception protocol, that together form the ’regulation protocol’ which make the
platform usable for B2B collaboration.
In the public perception protocol, buyers on the platform, send their feedback vec-
tors in an encrypted format to all the other buyers. The encryption scheme is homo-
morphic, allowing them to aggregate the data into a vector, without decrypting the
contents. This vector is then decrypted and buyers locally compute the rating vector
for the current round. In the monitoring protocol, each buyer’s feedback is sent to
a monitor, through the SE, encrypted with the monitor’s public key. A monitor is a
software entity itself, and does not know the identity of the corresponding buyer, iden-
tifying her only with an alternateId. The monitor uses this alternateId to alert the SE,
in case the buyer is found to be dishonest.
These protocols ensure that a reliable ratings vector is computed in each round.
This vector is used by the buyers to estimate which seller is most likely to give high-
quality. We conduct game theoretic analysis to characterize how to best incentivize
sellers to choose to produce high-quality goods. The purpose of this analysis is to help
a mechanism designer ensure that the rules and parameters of the market platform are
conducive to high-quality offerings in equilibrium.
Game Theoretic Analysis
We first studied a pricing rule where all sellers charge the same price. We found that
in such a pricing model, the only pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium possi-
ble, if any, will be either giving out only low quality or only high-quality. We further
deduced that profit margin and competition are necessary to induce high-quality offer-
ings. Within homogeneous pricing, two different punishment models were studied:
the “local punishment” model, where punishment is given locally for each infraction
made by the seller, and the “threshold punishment” model where sellers are punished
only when their ratings drop below a certain threshold. Out of the two, it was seen that
the threshold punishment model is comparatively better at disincentivizing low-quality
offerings.
We then studied a case where the prices charged by sellers can be one of two prices.
Within this case, we explored both types of pricing rules, where the price charged by
the sellers did and did not change. For both we found that given the parameters of the
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system, the binary pricing case would reduce to a case of homogeneous pricing with
certain parameters. We found that under any punishment rule in discrete pricing, a
seller giving only high-quality, would never lose buyers, and when all other sellers give
only low-quality, a seller giving high-quality, even sporadically, would be preferred by
all the buyers.
It was found that these two conditions do not hold in the case of continuous pric-
ing, where the price charged by a seller, changes even with small changes in the seller’s
public perception. When continuous pricing is adopted, behaviour of buyers is quite
different from the behaviour observed in discrete pricing. A seller with a poorer rating
may be preferred by certain buyers over a seller with a higher rating, as the former’s
price would be lower. As a result of this behaviour, a straightforward analysis of equi-
librium behaviour is not possible for continuous pricing.
6.2 Future Work
While the work presented in this thesis aims to be as comprehensive and cover as many
practical aspects as possible, there still remains scope for further work.
Heterogeneous Buyers
All buyers have so far been assumed to be homogeneous. Each buyer buys the same
quantity of the good in each round, and has the same value for the good. While,
the case of each buyer having non-identical, but consistent demand for the good can
be reduced to the model studied, with each buyer corresponding to as many pseudo-
buyers, as the units of good she demands, other case cannot be captured. The case of
buyers having inconsistent demand across rounds is interesting in itself.
Further, when buyers do not have the same valuation for the goods, defining a
threshold for the threshold punishment model itself becomes an interesting question.
Also, when buyers do not have identical valuations, it is not necessary that vH − pH be
greater than vL − pL. The analysis gets further complicated when this relation holds
for a fraction of buyers and does not for others.
The assumption that all buyers are identical to sellers need not be true itself. Cer-
tain buyers may be more influential than others, and consequently, sellers may try to
sustain their costs by giving high-quality to important buyers and low-quality to less
important ones. Thus, buyers being heterogeneous is an intriguing direction of future
work.
Economies of Scale and Seller Capacities
The model presented in this paper assumes that each seller can produce as many goods
as requested, and the cost of producing each good is fixed. This is not consistent
with commonly studied economic models. Microeconomic analysis commonly studies
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a case of Economies of Scale, where the cost of producing each additional unit of a good
initially decreases and then becomes constant/increases. This case is demonstrated in
Figure 6.1. This variability is not captured in the model discussed, but is essential to
completely capture real-world settings.
Figure 6.1: Economies of Scale [11]
Like costs are not fixed, neither is the additional profit from each unit of good sold.
The famous “Law of Diminishing Returns” states that there is always a point beyond
which it is no longer profitable to sell an additional unit of the good. Thus, for each
seller, selling a particular good, there is a capacity beyond which it is not profitable
for the seller to sell. Incorporating such capacities makes the selection of a seller by a
buyer less straightforward, giving scope for changes to the model presented.
Also, the purpose of the analysis presented was to maximize the high-quality offer-
ings, without any regards to the revenue generated. A study of a setting which aims to
achieve an optimal tradeoff between the two will be relevant.
Uncertainty in the Quality Produced
Throughout the analysis we assume that a seller has complete control over the quality
delivered to the buyer. The model presented does not take into consideration possi-
bilities of error, which are beyond the control of the seller. This error may stem from
manufacturing defects or from a mistake on the part of the logistics provider. How-
ever, if the model were to recognize possibility of non-strategic reasons behind a buyer
receiving low-quality, the punishment models would need to be modified.
While the threshold punishment model does not need any further restructuring to
address such a case, the local punishment model may be unnecessarily harsh for this
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setting. Punishing every individual infraction would not be appropriate. One possible
punishment method would be to punish the seller with the probability of receiving
high-quality, when the seller intends to produce high-quality. Under such a punishment
rule, the analysis would change drastically, even for cases that presently seem to be
relatively straightforward.
Differing Initial Perceptions
The analysis of Binary Pricing rules assumes that a buyer has the same perception for
all sellers, irrespective of the price they are selling at need not be true. Logically, a
seller selling a good at a higher price should guarantee better quality. Thus, differing
values of ξ for different price brackets, with buyers further having different values of ξ
amongst each other as well.
The assumption of the quality of a product being one of two states itself is somewhat
harsh. Quality of a product may be one of many discrete states, or may even belong
to a continuous interval. For example the duration before the product wears out is a
good indication of its quality. In such a setting, valuations will also change from a set
of values to a function, giving scope for further work in this direction.
Learning Mechanisms
The work discussed in this thesis is purely analytical. We assume that the parameters
of the system are correctly known by all the agents, and agents even know their own
private values correctly. The latter need not be true in the case of sellers. A seller need
not accurately know the quality that he is capable of providing, and further need not
know the price that he should be charging.
In such a case, it would be appropriate to have a learning mechanism which,
through the feedback provided by the buyers, aims to learn the quality of the sell-
ers and accordingly elicit a price corresponding to each seller. Such a mechanism can
be implemented by means of a smart contract on the platform, in conjunction with the
regulation protocols, so as to maintain the anonymity requirements. As a step towards
achieving such a mechanism, a mechanism design formulation of the problem studied
in this thesis would be required.
Decentralizing the Software Entity
Currently, the software entity plays a single point of centralization in the monitor-
ing protocol. This doesn’t fit very well within the decentralized paradigm intended
by blockchains. A significant improvement would be to have a distributed manner of
matching buyers with monitors without leaking the identity of the buyers to the mon-
itors. Eliminating the need of zero-knowledge proofs in this system would be another
possible line of future work.
Chapter 6. Summary and Future Work 65
Implementation
The implementation of a B2B market platform, as studied in this thesis is of inde-
pendent interest. As discussed, the implementation is very much feasible on currently
available blockchain technology, such as Hyperledger Fabric. It is, however, non-trivial.
While, private channels between a buyer and seller and well-established on such plat-
forms, providing for inter-operable smart contracts is not easy to accomplish. Further,
implementing MPC protocols on a blockchain-based framework are a novel contribu-
tion in itself. The implementation using permissioned blockchains to deploy smart
contracts to compute reliable ratings and incentivize sellers to provide high-quality is
necessary to bring to completion the work presented in this thesis. This we believe is
an important direction for translating this work into a real-world system.
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